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ABSTRACT 
This paper seeks to shed some light on the meanmg of the terms 
amiable compositeur and ex aequo et bono, as contained in Article 28(3) of 
the UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration. The 
common derivative of both terms is that an arbitrator will be empowered to 
depart from the law to find an equitable solution to a dispute. Such an 
approach requires an arbitrator to seek out the fairest solution and, in the case 
of amiable composition, arguably attempt to thereby restore commercial 
harmony between the parties. To this end, they are especially suited to long 
term and evolving commercial relationships. Parties and practitioners must be 
conscious of the discretion and subjectivity inherent in the task of an arbitrator 
charged with deciding a case according to his or her own notions of what is 
fair and just - hence, the title of this paper. But ultimately, there is nothing 
problematic about allowing an arbitrator to decide by reference to extra-legal 
considerations. If parties are prepared to forego certainty for the sake of their 
ongoing business relationships, party autonomy dictates that their choice will 
be put into effect. 
Statement of word length: 14,755 words 
I. INTRODUCTION 
"Equity is a roguish thing. For law we have a measure, know what to trust to; Equity is 
according to the conscience of him that is Chancellor, and as that is larger or narrower, 
so is Equity. 'T is all one as if they should make the standard for the measure we call a 
"foot" a Chancellor's foot; what an uncertain measure would this be! One Chancellor 
has a long foot, another a short foot, a third an indifferent foot. 'T is the same thing in 
the Chancellor's conscience. "1 
This was how seventeenth Century jurist John Selden famously rebuked the 
concept of equity, as it was then administered by the Chancellors in England. As 
"keeper of the King's conscience", the Chancellor of the time was empowered to 
give discretionary relief from the common law where the law failed to provide a 
fair or just result.2 This practice provides one example of the "continual 
movement in legal history back and forth between wide discretion and strict 
detailed rules, between justice without law, as it were, and justice according to 
law."3 This paper explores another example of that movement in the context of 
the mode of arbitration known as amiable composition. 
Fourty-five countries,4 including ew Zealand, have embraced the 
UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration ('the Model 
Law'). 5 For many countries, this has entailed taking on terms and procedures 
unknown to them. This was necessary to achieve the "worldwide consensus on 
the principles and important issues of international arbitration practice",6 which 
1 F Po llock (ed), Table Talk of John Selden ( 1927). 
2 Spiller, Finn and Boast, A New Zealand legal History (Brookers, Wellington, 1995), at pp. 19-
20. 
3 Roscoe Pound, An Introduction to the Philosophy of law (Yale University Press, 1954). 
4 Australia, Azerbaijan, Bahrain , Bangladesh, Belarus, Bermuda, Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, in 
China: Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, Macau Special Administrative Region; 
Croatia, Cyprus, Egypt, Germany, Greece, Guatemala, Hungary, India, Iran (Islamic Republic 
of), lreland, Japan, Jordan, Kenya, Lithuania, Madagascar, Malta, Mexico, New Zealand, Nigeria, 
Oman, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Republic of Korea, Russian Federation, Singapore, Spain, Sri 
Lanka, Thailand, Tunisia, Ukraine, within the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern 
Ireland: Scotland; in Bermuda, overseas territory of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and 
orthern Ireland ; within the United States of America: California, Connecticut, Illinois, Oregon 
and Texas; Zambia, and Zimbabwe. See Status of Texts, Status of Conventions and Model Laws, 
UNCITRAL <http ://www.uncitral.org> (last accessed I June 2005). 
5 Adopted on 21 June 1985 by the United ations Commission on International Trade Law 
('UNCITRAL'). United Nations document A/40/ 17, Annex l. 
6 See the Explanatory Note by the U CITRAL Secretariat: United Nations document A/40/17, 
Annex l. 
is the Model Law's principal strength. In particular, Article 28(3) of the Model 
Law provides: 
"The arbitral tribunal shall decide ex aequo et bona or as amiable compositeur only if 
the parties have expressly authori:::ed it to do so. " 
This paper seeks to shed some light on the meaning of the terms amiable 
compositeur and ex aequo et bona, and will show that they are each context 
specific. Practitioners must be especially careful when considering including 
these terms within their contracts as their precise meaning can be affected by 
surrounding clauses and the place of arbitration. The common derivative of both 
terms is that an arbitrator will be empowered to depart from the law to find an 
equitable solution to a dispute. As will be discussed in Part III, such an approach 
requires an arbitrator to seek out the fairest solution and arguably attempt to 
thereby restore commercial harmony between the parties. To this end, they are 
especially suited to long term and evolving commercial relationships. However, 
arbitrators are not given an absolute discretion. As for all arbitrators, they are 
subject to the principles of procedural fairness , and mandatory rules having a 
public policy character. The procedural law or rules under which the arbitration 
is conducted will also have a bearing on the scope of an amiable compositeur 's 
powers - in particular, regarding whether the arbitrator can modify or depart 
from the terms of the contract. 
Part IV of the paper will examine the legal efficacy of clauses purporting 
to confer such powers on arbitrators, which has recently been confirmed m 
England and New Zealand, and will consider why it has never really been m 
doubt in many other countries. Part V will conclude by examining the perceived 
advantages and disadvantages of this mode of arbitration. 
II. THE AMBIGUITIES 
A. Amiable Composition, Decisions Ex Aequo Et Bono and Equity Clauses 
-Synonyms? 
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The power to rule ex aequo et bona is frequently treated as the synonym 
for the power of an arbitrator to decide as amiable compositeur. 7 As suggested 
briefly above, the common derivative of both terms is that an arbitrator will be 
empowered to depart from strict law, or legally recognisable criteria, to find a 
fair and equitable solution to a dispute. Provisions purporting to confer such a 
power have, particularly in England, been labelled equity clauses.8 However, 
while these terms have been roughly assimilated in the arbitral context, it is far 
from certain that they are coextensive and amiable composition arguably 
contemplates a conciliatory element that the power to decide ex aequo et bona 
does not. Indeed, both terms are used in the Model Law because it was thought 
that some systems might distinguish between them. 9 Furthermore, strong 
resistance to extra-legal decision-making in arbitration by the English judiciary 
has resulted in a narrow interpretation of equity clauses that is no longer 
justifiable in light of the recent developments canvassed below. 
I. Amiable composition 
The French term amiable compositeur translates literally to "friendly 
settlor", or "author of friendly compromise". The amiable compositeur is 
generally thought to be the product of French legal thinking. 10 However, 
deriving from the Latin term amicabilis compositor, the incipient stages of this 
procedure can be traced to 13th century Rome. 11 According to Rene David, the 
generalisation of this institution was the work of canonist lawyers: 
7 This assimilation is the prevailing opinion of French writers. For example, see Eric Loquin, 
L 'A miable Composition en Droit Compare et International (Librairies Techniques, Paris, 1980), 
at p.25 et seq; and J. Robert, l 'arbitrage, droit interne, droit international prive (Dalloz, 1983) at 
p. 161. Cf Mauro Rubino-Sammartano, "A miable Compositeur (Joint Mandate to Settle) and Ex 
Bono et Aequo (Discretional Authority to Mitigate Strict Law): Apparent Synonyms Revisited" 
(1992) 9(1)J. lnt 'I Arb. 5, at p.13 . 
8 Mustill and Boyd, Commercial Arbitration (2ed, Butterworths, London and Edinburgh, 1989) 
75. 
9 See Second Working Group Report, A/CN.9/232, para. 169; Seventh Secretariat Note, 
A/CN.9/264, para. 7. Set out in Holtzmann and Neuhaus, A Guide to the UNC!TRAL Model law 
on International Commercial Arbitration (Kluwer Law and Taxation Publishers, Deventer, The 
Netherlands, 1989) at pp.780 and 790, respectively. 
10 See for example, Craig, Park and Paulsson International Chamber of Commerce Arbitration (3 
ed, Oceana Publications Inc, Dobbs Ferry, New York, 2000) at p. 110. 
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"For them [the canonists] all promises had to be kept (Pacta sun/ servanda) and all 
contracts were equally governed by the paramount principle of good faith (/ides). The 
narrow mould in which the function of an arbitrator was confined was therefore broken 
(besides arbitration ex compromisso discussed below, and certain privileged types of 
arbitration such as arbitration by a bishop, recourse to an arbitrator was previously 
limited to contracts including a particular duty of good faith , in which the parties 
remitted certain clauses for determination by the arbitrator). An attempt was made on 
the other hand to imbue the law with ideas of conciliation and of charity advocated by 
the Church. Parties to a contract, who submitted a dispute arising between them to an 
arbitrator, readily accepted in advance that their relation would have a new basis; the 
arbitrator probably considered at the outset what were the rights and duties of each of 
the parties at law, but he would not regard such an enquiry as final, but would also on 
this basis take into consideration the requirements of equity and espectially [sic] 
endeavour to reestablish harmony between the litigants. 
The importance attributed by canonists to the principle of good faith and the 
predilection of the Church for conciliation led to a transformation of the role of the 
arbitrator, as it had been conceived in Rome. "11 
The emphasis on conciliation and re-establishing harmony between the litigants 
is evinced by the fact the original role of the amicabilis compositor was not to 
adjudicate, but to bring the parties together and promote understanding between 
them in order to bring about a sort of compromise. 13 Thus, Bouteiller refers to 
the amicabilis compositor as tractator concordiae, or he who negotiates the 
peace. 14 However, the amicabilis compositor was gradually recognised as having 
the power to impose a decision. This blurred the line between the amicabilis 
compositor and the arbiter ex compromisso, who had the power to make a 
binding award. 15 There is no compelling evidence that an arbiter was required to 
11 See Bartolo da Sassoferrato, De receptis arbitris, Fol. 146; Baldo degli Ubaldi, D. 4, 8, 14 Fol. 
258; Durand, Speculum judiciale, I, Fol. 95, p. I . Cited in Rubino-Sammartano, above fn 7, at 
p. 13 . 
12 Rene David, Arbitration in International Trade (Kluwer Law and Taxation Publishers, 
Deventer, The Netherlands, 1985), p.86 . 
13 In his Somme rural, Bouteiller writes that the amicabilis compositor " ne peut sentencier, mais 
peut seulement traicter acord entre Jes parties" (cannot adjudicate, but can only promote some 
understanding between the parties) : Bouteiller, Somme rural, 11 , III , at 693. Cited in David, 
above fn 12, at p.87, fn I O; and Rubino-Sammartano, above fn 7, at p.13 , fn 67. 
14 Cited in Loquin, above fn 7 at p. 14. 
15 Roman Jaw never recognised the principle of freedom of contract. Very few contracts were 
recognised by the law and an arbitration agreement was not one of them . However, parties were 
able to enforce their agreements by way of a double promise (com-promissum), which stipulated 
that one party would pay the other a penalty in the event that he or she did not submit to 
arbitration or honour the award. While the Jaw did not recognise the arbitration agreement, it did 
enforce the mutual promise : See David, above fn 12, at pp.84-85. 
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decide according to law. 16 Indeed, the law was in a state of flux and what legal 
rules existed often had to evolve with a changing society. 17 In 1 ?1h and I 8th 
century France, some jurists professed that all arbitrators had some power to 
decide in accordance with equity. 18 However, it is clear that the amiable 
compositeur was not bound to decide in law, since the role was traditionally 
regarded as conciliatory in nature and was therefore permeated with the canonist 
emphasis on equity. In 1806, in order to remove any confusion, the French Code 
of Civil Procedure upheld amiable composition as a form of arbitration, which 
permitted the arbitrator to decide in accordance with equity, rather than strict 
law. 19 Thus, the transformation from conciliation to arbitration was complete, 
and it is for this reason that amiable composition has come to be assimilated with 
a decision in equity, or ex aequo et bono.2° Fouchard, Gaillard and Goldman 
have stated that any distinction is artifical "given that, in either case, the 
arbitrators could choose to have their sense of what justice requires prevail over 
any other consideration."21 However, as will be discussed separately below,22 
the conciliatory origins of the amiable compositeur retain significance. 
2. Ex aequo et bona 
16 David refers to Y. Jeanclos, [ 'arbitrage en Bourgogne et en Champagne au XVe siec/e ( 1977) 
as authority for the proposition that lists were compiled by "notaires" in I 5th century Burgundy 
and Champagne as to where parties might find "legally qualified arbitrators". However, David 
also states that any requirement for an arbiter ex compromisso to decide as a Judge does not find 
support in the texts of Roman law and was far from firmly established: See David, above fn 12, at 
p.87 fn 9 . 
17 See David, above fn 12, at p.87. 
18 Equity is used in the broad sense here, and should not be taken as a reference to the technical 
body of rules described as equity in the common law. The distinction will be drawn out in 
relation to the definition of ex aequo el bona below. The jurists in question were Domat and 
Jousse: See David, at fn 12, p.89, citing W. Wenger, Zum obligationenrechllichen 
Sciedsverfahren im schwei:::.erischen Rech I ( 1968), at p. 128 (note), and G. Marani , Aspell, 
nego:::.iali e aspelti processuali dell 'arbitralo ( I 966) , at p.80. Whether anything of the ancient 
conception that equity goes hand in hand with arbitration, even where the parties have not 
conferred the powers of an amiable compositeur, is the subject of a very useful discussion by 
Pierre Mayer in " Reflections on the International Arbitrator 's Duty to Apply the Law - The 2000 
Fresh fields Lecture" (2001) 17(3) Arb. Jnt 'I 235. 
19 See Hong-lin Yu, " Amiable Composition - A Learning Curve" (2000) 17(1) J. Jnt 'l Arb. 79, at 
p.86. 
20 Discussed in the next section. 
21 Emmanuel Gaillard and John Savage (eds), Fouchard, Gaillard, Goldman on Internatwnal 
Commercial Arbitration (Kluwer Law International , The Hague, 1999) at p.836. 
22 See Part 11 D "The Conciliation Element". 
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The Latin term ex aequo et bono refers to the power to decide under 
aequitas, a Roman notion first set out by Aristotle in Nichomachean Ethics. 23 
Mauro Rubino-Sammartano describes the power as a "discretional [sic] power to 
mitigate strict law" and likens it to Billigkeitrecht (the law of equity) in 
Germany, and the former prerogative of the Norman Kings in England to grant 
discretionary equitable relief from the law "as fountains of justice", subsequently 
vested in the Court of Chancery and the above-mentioned Chancellors.24 On this 
interpretation, the power of the arbitrator would be to mollify the harsh effects of 
the law where it would produce unjust results, subject to mandatory provisions. 
This can be contrasted with arbitration "in equity" as it exists in Switzerland, 
which some suggest is detached from even mandatory legal rules. 25 The term 
can be interpreted to mean "in justice and fairness", "according to equity and 
good conscience" or "according to what is good and just".26 What is clear is that 
this term must not be interpreted to mean equity in the limited technical sense 
given to it in most common law countries. In England and New Zealand, equity 
is now firmly part of the law. But precedent has tied its hands and 
compartmentalised it into specific doctrines, remedies and defences. In Didymi 
Corporation v Atlantic Lines and Navigation Co Ltd,27 Hobhouse J distinguished 
between clauses referring to the technical body of law described as equity and 
clauses requiring the arbitrator to decide other than according to legally 
recognisable criteria. This paper is only concerned with the latter, since in 
England (and New Zealand) both law and equity are administered concurrently 
in all divisions of the High Court and the Court of Appeal.28 Accordingly, if 
either English or New Zealand law were to apply, an arbitrator would be entitled 
to decide in accordance with technical equity in any event - a clause stating that 
would add nothing. Indeed, where the rules of equity and the rules of the 
common law conflict, the former prevail.29 A decision made according to 
23 See Rubino-Sammartano, above fn 7 at p.6. 
24 See fn 23 above. 
25 Pierre Lalive, Jean-Francois Poudret, Claude Reymond, Le Droit de L 'Arbitrage lnterne et 
International en Suisse ( 1989) 40 I and the references cited therein . 
26 Black 's Law Dictionary (6 ed , West, 1990), at p. 557. 
27 [1987] 2 Lloyd ' s Rep 166 at 170. 
28 See the Judicature Act 1873 (UK) and the Judicature Act 1925 (UK), s.36. 
29 In New Zealand, see s.99 of the Judicature Act 1908. Also see Lew, Applicable law in 
International Commercial Arbitration (Oceana Publications Inc, Dobbs Ferry, New York, 1978) 
170, fn 142.2 . 
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technical equity is thus made intra legem (within the law), but a decision ex 
aequo et bona is made contra legem (outside the law). 
3. Equity clauses 
In Orion Compania Espana/a de Seguros v Belfort Maatschappij Voor 
Algemene Verzekgringeen30, Megaw J held that: 
" ... it is the policy of this country[England] that (...) arbitrators must in general apply a 
fixed and recognisable system of law (. . .) and that they cannot be allowed to apply some 
different criterion such as the view of the individual arbitrator or umpire on abstract 
justice or equitable principles ... ". 
Thus, a contractual provision that purported to relieve an arbitrator from 
following the strict rules of law was not a valid arbitration agreement. 31 In 
England, such provisions have been labelled "equity clauses" and are common 
only in reinsurance treaties.32 The Courts' approach to these clauses was 
justified on the basis of their supervisory jurisdiction over arbitration. That 
jurisdiction would effectively be ousted if the parties could agree that the dispute 
be decided other than in accordance with the law, since there would be no 
question of law for the Court to review.33 But in Eagle Star Insurance Co v 
Yuval Insurance Co Ltd,34 Lord Denning MR was unable to agree with Megaw 
J's approach in Orion. In Eagle Star, the clause in question provided: 
30 
[ 1962) I Lloyd 's Rep 257, at p.264. Hereafter Orion. 
31 The clause in question provided : "The Arbitrators and Umpire are relieved from all judicial 
formalities and may abstain from following the strict rules of law. They will settle any dispute 
under this Agreement according to an equitable rather than a strictly lega l interpretation of its 
terms and their decision shall be final and not subject to appeal." 
32 See Mustill and Boyd, above fn 8, at pp. 74-75. At note 8, the authors state that they do not 
know of any other field of English Commercial law in which clauses of these type are regu larly 
used . The authors also state that the use of such clauses has been attributable more to a desire to 
avoid certain provisions of the now repealed Stamp Acts, than to an appeal to abstract Just ice. 
However, the importance of good faith in insurance treaties may also provide a link with amiable 
composition, as will be discussed below. 
33 Megaw J relied heavily on C::arnikow v Roth, Schmidt & Co. [ 1922) 2 K.B. 478, (1922) 12 
LI.L.Rep. 195, where the Court of Appeal held that a purported ouster of the Court's Jurisdiction 
to require the arbitrators to state a special case was contrary to public policy and void 
34 
[ 1978) I Lloyd 's Rep 357. Hereafter Eagle Star. 
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"The Arbitrators and Umpire shall not be bound by the strict rules of law but shall settle 
any difference referred to them according to an equitable rather than a strictly legal 
interpretation of the provisions of this Agreement ... "35 
Lord Denning MR did not consider this clause to be problematic, stating: 
"J must say that 1 cannot see anything in public policy to make this clause void. On the 
contrary the clause seems to me to be entirely reasonable. ft does not oust the 
jurisdiction of the Courts. ft only ousts technicalities and strict constructions. That is 
what equity did in the old days. And it is what arbitrators may properly do today under 
a clause such as this. 
(...) 
So 1 am prepared to hold that this arbitration clause, in all its provisions, is valid and of 
full effect, including the requirement that the arbitrators shall decide on equitable 
grounds rather than a strict legal interpretation. I realise, of course, that this lessens 
the points on which one party or the other can ask for a case stated. But that is no bad 
thing. Cases stated have been carried too far. ft would be to the advantage of the 
commercial community that they should be reduced: and a claim of this kind would go 
far to ensure this. "36 
Later cases have essentially come to distinguish Eagle Star from Orion 
on the basis that the former only involves ousting strict constructions of 
contractual terms, whereas the Orion clause sought to oust principles of law.37 In 
Home and Overseas Insurance Co Ltd v Mentor Insurance (UK) Ltd38 the 
English Court of Appeal was asked to consider an arbitration clause that 
provided: 
"The arbitrators and the umpire shall interpret this insurance as an honourable 
engagement and they shall make their award with a view to effecting the general 
35 See fn 34 above, at p. 357. 
'6 " See fn 34 above, at p. 362. 
37 Merkin, Arbitration law (LLP, London, Singapore, 2004) at para 7.54. See Home insurance 
Co v Administratia Asegurarilorde Stal [ 1983] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 674; and Home and Overseas 
Insurance Co Ltd v Mentor insurance (UK) ltd [ 1989) 3 All ER 74. Cf Overseas Union Inc v AA 
Mutual insurance ltd [ 1988) I FTLR 421, where Evans J criticised the Eagle Star and Home 
Insurance decisions on the basis that they did not clarify what an equity clause allowed For His 
Honour, the clause did not allow any rules of law to be disregarded (including rules of 
construction), but merely allowed an arbitrator to utilise his or her own knowledge of the 
insurance business in interpreting the contract. 
38 [1989) 3 All ER 74. 
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purpose of this reinsurance in a reasonable manner rather than in accordance with a 
literal interpretation of the language." 
The Court of Appeal held that this was a valid arbitration clause and directed the 
parties to go to arbitration. However, Parker LJ echoed Megaw J's statement 
from Orion when His Lordship stated: 
"/ have no hesitation in accepting the submission ... that a clause which purported to 
free arbitrators to decide without regard to the law and accordingly, f or example, to 
their own notions of what would be fair would not be a valid arbitration clause. "39 
This was so, despite the then extant Arbitration Act 1979 (UK) allowing the 
contractual exclusion of appeals and undermining the original justification for the 
Courts' stance proffered by Megaw J. For the Court of Appeal , the clause in 
question did little more than allow the arbitrators to depart from the plain 
meaning of the words. In this respect, Parker LJ cited with approval Lord 
Diplock' s statement in The Antaios that: 
if detailed semantic and syntactical and syntactical analysis of words in a 
commercial contract is going to lead to a conclusion that flouts business common sense, 
· b d . Id b . ,AO tt must e ma e to y 1e to us mess common sense. 
Lord Diplock' s statement is now an accepted part of the principles for the 
construction of contractual documents, as set out by Lord Hoffman in Investors 
Compensation Scheme Ltd v West Bromwich Building Sociefy .4 1 Thus, an 
arbitrator would not be empowered to do anything special under the clause in 
question. However, it is arguable that Lord Denning MR' s reference in Eagle 
Star to the ousting of "technicalities and strict constructions" contemplates much 
more. This is particularly so in light of the wider clause under consideration in 
that case and His Lordship ' s reference to what "equity did in the old days", 
which evokes thoughts of the Lord Chancellor' s former power to come to the 
rescue of a petitioner by limiting the application of a common law rule that 
39 Above fn 38, at p. 80. 
40 Antaios Compania Naviera SA v Salen Rederierna AB, The Antaios [ 1985] AC 191 at p.200. 
41 [1998] I All ER 98 (HL), at pp. 114-11 5. Adopted by the ew Zea land Court of Appeal in 
Boat Park Lid v Hutchinson [ 1999] 2 NZLR 74 at pp. 81-82. 
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operated harshly in the circumstances. The debate has largely been superseded 
by the legislative amendments discussed below, which place a premium on party 
autonomy and a correlating limitation of judicial intervention. But as will be 
seen, these cases may have continuing relevance to the relationship between 
amiable composition and a right to appeal on a question of law. 
-/.. Terminology 
To avoid adding to the ambiguities being discussed, the terms amiable 
composition or amiable compositeur will be used from this point forward unless 
the context requires otherwise. Amiable composition arguably contemplates 
more than the other terms already discussed, so that an evaluation of its 
constituent powers will necessarily cover those of the other terms. 
B. Contrast with Lex Mercatoria42 
Some authors have argued that an amiable compositeur ought to take into 
account general principles of law. This has led to some confusion about the 
relationship between amiable composition and the new lex mercatoria. For 
example, Goldman has stated: 
" .. . a reference lo equity or, in a different f orm, the instruction given to him or her to 
rule ex aequo et bona, should lead the arbitrator acting as amiable compositeur to take 
into account general principles of law and international trade practices. Interpreted in 
this way, an amiable composition clause can be considered as referring implicitly lo /ex 
mercatoria. "43 
As Mustill and Boyd have noted, the attraction of this argument is that it 
avoids the "awkwardness of accepting the parties have agreed to subject their 
12 Literally " law merchant". 
13 Goldman, la /ex mercatoria dans les con/rats et / 'arbitrage internationaux realite et 
perspectives, cited in Fouchard, Gaillard, Goldman, above fn 2 1 at p. 838. 
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relationship to the personal views of an arbitrator as to the justice of the case, 
largely unfettered by objective norms ... "44 Awkward or not, that is exactly what 
amiable composition mandates - a common sense approach that is not bound by 
legal technicalities.45 Amiable composition and the new lex mercatoria, insofar 
as it exists, may (in some cases/6 share the common thread of being divorced 
from any national system of law and can therefore be described as "a-national". 
However, the fundamental distinction is that the former is a variety of arbitration 
that vests an arbitrator with the power to decide by reference to extra-legal 
criteria, while the latter comprises a body of transnational rules that might be 
applied in any arbitration. Apparently eroding Megaw J's requirement in Orion 
for arbitrators to decide by reference to a "fixed and recognisable system of 
law",47 two English cases have signalled acceptance of the latter. 
In Deutsche Schachtbau-und Tiejbohrgesellschaft mbH v R 'As Al 
Khaimah National Oil Co and Shell International Petroleum Co Ltd (No 's 1 & 
2),48 the Court of Appeal upheld a Swiss arbitral award where, under the ICC 
Rules then in force,49 the arbitrators had applied " internationally accepted 
principles of law governing contractual relations" in the absence of a choice of 
law by the parties. Later, the House of Lords upheld the parties ' choice of a-
national principles in Channel Tunnel Group Ltd v Balfour Beatty Constructions 
Ltd. 50 In that case, the parties to the Channel Tunnel construction consortium 
agreed that the contract should: 
" ... in all respects be governed by and interpreted in accordance with the principles 
common to both English and French law, and in the absence of such principles, b;, such 
general principles of international law as have been applied by national and 
international tribunals. "51 
44 Mustill and Boyd, above fn 8, at p.80. 
45 Leo D' Arey, Carole Murray and Barbara Cleave, Schmitthojf's Export Trade: The Law and 
Practice of International Trade ( I O ed, Sweet & Maxwell, London, 2000) at p. 479. 
46 As will be discussed below, it is possible for amiable composition to be used in combination 
with a choice of law clause. In such a case, the arbitrator will be required to start with the 
applicable law and mollify its effects where he or she considers it fair to do so. 
47 See "Equity clauses" above, Part II A 3. 
48 
[ 1988) 2 Lloyd 's Rep. 293. Hereafter Deutsche Schachtbau. 
49 Article 13.3 of the ICC Rules of Conciliation and Arbitration 1975 : "The parties shall be free to 
determine the law to be applied by the arbitrator to the merits of the dispute. In the absence of 
any indication by the parties as to the applicable law, the arbitrator shall apply the law designated 
as the proper law by the rule of conflict which he deems appropriate." 
50 
[ 1993) AC 334. 
51 Above fu 64, at p. 347. 
As for amiable composition, the legislative amendments canvassed below should 
remove any doubt about the efficacy of such a choice. But as Deutsche 
Schachtbau and other cases show, in the case of !ex mercatoria it appears that an 
arbitrator may apply it in the absence of such a choice. 52 
An amiable compositeur may seek guidance from the !ex, but is not 
bound to apply it should it conflict with his or her sense of equity and fairness. 53 
For example, in ICC Case No. 326754 the arbitral tribunal professed that their 
award was in accordance with "widely accepted general principles govermng 
international commercial law". 55 Those principles were stated to be totally 
consistent with the principles of fairness and equity. However, the tribunal also 
stated: 
"As a matter of principle, the arbitral tribunal does not reject 1he view tha1 an amiable 
compositeur may go beyond cerlain solulions deriving from the normally applicable 
legal rules, be they 1hose of a municipal legal system or those of lex mercatoria."56 
Nevertheless, in an apparent attempt to avoid being seen as arbitrary some 
tribunals seem to have subordinated their powers of amiable composition to the 
!ex mercatoria. For example, in an ICC arbitration regarding the sale and 
purchase of livestock, the arbitral tribunal held that the essence of an amiable 
composition clause was to obviate the need for a specific set of legal rules. But 
rather than being arbitrary, a decision in such cases was to be based on general 
principles of responsibility for failure to perform contractual obligations. 57 Also, 
52 See Compania Valenciana de Cementos S.A. v Primary Coal Inc. (22 October 1991, Judgment 
No. 1534 PRF, Cour de Cassation) [ 1991] Mealey 's lnt 'I Arb. Rep. 7; Palbalk Ticaret Ltd Sirketi 
v Norsolor S.A., ICC Case o. 3131, [ 1984) IX YBCA I 09, uphe ld by both the Cour de Cassation 
in France (Norsolor S.A. v Palbalk Ticaret Ltd Sirketi ( 1985) XXIV I.L.M . 360) and the Austrian 
Supreme Court (Norsolor S.A. v Palbalk Ticaret Ltd Sirketi ( 1984) IX YBCA 159); and 
Fougerolle (France) v Banque du Proch Orient (Lebanon) (1982) J.D.I 931; (1983) REV. ARB. 
183 . Also see Ole Lando "The Lex Mercatoria in International Commercial Arbitration" ( 1985) 
34 ICLQ 747, at p.757; and De Ly, International Business Law and the Lex Mercatoria (TMC 
Asser Institute, The Hague, 1992) at p.222. 
53 See Fouchard, Gaillard, Goldman, above fn 21 at p. 838. 
54 Mexican Construction Company v Belgian Company (Member of a Consortium), Final A ward 
of 28 March 1984 in ICC Case o. 3267; ( 1987) XII YBCA 87. See also French Company v 
African State ICC Case o. 3327 ( I 98 I), ( 1982) J .D.I. 971. 
55 Above fn 54, (1987) XII YBCA 87 at p.95 . 
56 Above fn 54, (1987) XII YBCA 87 at p.88. 
57 Seller (Yugoslavia) v Buyer (France), ICC Case No. 2879 (1978), (1979) J.D.I. 989. 
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m Mechema Ltd v SA. Mines, Minerais et Metaux58, a case regarding the 
termination of an exclusive world distributorship agreement, the tribunal stated: 
"Having established that the character of the contract, and the place where it has its 
effect, necessarily exclude an obligato1y application of either Belgian or English law, it 
is for the above-mentioned reasons that the arbitrators will abide by the 'lex mercatoria ' 
in the exercise of their powers as amiable compositeurs."59 
According to Fouchard, Gaillard and Goldman, any confusion is down to the fact 
that amiable composition was once (during the 1950's and 1960's) considered a 
conduit through which the lex mercatoria could be applied and developed.60 In 
their opinion, and as stated above, the lex now has sufficient substance that it 
may be applied even in the absence of any choice by the parties, much less an 
amiable composition clause. 61 However, an ordinary arbitrator deciding 
according to law must first ascertain the existence and applicability of such 
1 . . l 62 genera pnnc1p es. evertheless, amiable composition may remain a source of 
the lex where a decision is based upon a comparative analysis of the legal 
systems involved. 63 
What is apparent is that many arbitrators are not comfortable basing their 
decisions upon their subjective appraisal of the equities of a case. Instead, they 
seek out objective criteria. Whether any such criteria are compatible with the 
role of an amiable compositeur is discussed below. 64 
C. Other Clauses Affecting tile Meaning 
Context is central to resolving any ambiguities surrounding the nature and 
scope of an amiable compositeur's powers. For example, an unqualified 
reference to amiable composition may be regarded as enabling an arbitrator to 
completely disregard the law, and straight away seek out what he or he 
58 (ad hoe award of3 November 1977) 1980 REV ARB. 560; (1982) Vil YBCA 77. 59 (1982) Vil YBCA 77, at p.78. 
60 Above fn 21 at p. 838, citing Phillipe Kahn, la Vente Commerciale lnlernationale 38 ( 1961 ). 61 See above fn 60. 
62 See Craig, Park and Paulsson, above fn I O at p.111. 
63 See Klaus Peter Berger, The Creeping Codification of the Lex Mercatoria (Kluwer, The Hague, 1999) at p. 59. 
64 See Part Ill C "Duty to Seek the Fairest Solution". 
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considers to be the fairest solution.65 In other circumstances, the arbitrator may 
be required to start with the applicable law and limit its effects where considered 
equitable to do so. An express choice of law gives a signal that the latter 
approach is to be preferred, since the former would render the choice of law 
meaningless, and this corresponds with the approach of arbitrators in practice. 66 
A more difficult question concerns the compatibility of an amiable composition 
clause with a right of appeal. 
Nowadays, the grounds for the judicial review of arbitral awards are very 
limited. An arbitrator 's findings of fact are basically untouchable. 67 In the 
limited instances that an appeal on a question of law is available, parties are 
generally able to exclude the prospect. 68 The DAC Report in support of what is 
now the Arbitration Act 1996 (UK) stated that an equity clause would effectively 
serve as an exclusion agreement, since there is no point of law involved. 69 An 
appellate Court cannot review a decision arrived at without any reference to a 
legal standard and, in any event, is in no better position to judge the equities of a 
case than the tribunal below. Thus, in The State of Senegal v Express-
Navigation,70 the Supreme Court of Senegal held that a review of the merits of an 
award was not compatible with a valid reference to amiable composition. But 
the DAC's statement may be an oversimplification. As will be discussed below, 
65 See Three European Companies v Four Tuni ian Companies, ICC Case No. 5 I O ( 1988), 
(1988) 115 J.D.l. 1206. 
66 For example, see ICC Case o. 2139 (1974), (1975) 102 J.D.I. 929; and State-owned Company, Seller v Norwegian Purchaser, ICC Case No. 2216 (1974), (1975) 102 J.D.I. 917, and 
observations by Y. Derains at p.920. 
67 See Pupeke Service Station Ltd v Caltex Oil (NZ) Ltd (Unreported, Privy Council, Appeal No. 
63/ 1994, 16 November 1995), where Lord Mustill stated "Where the criticism is that the arbitrator has made an error of fact, it is an almost invariable rule that the Court will not mterfere. 
Subject to the most limited exceptions, not relevant here, the findings of fact by the arbitrator are impregnable, however flawed they may appear. On occa ion, lo ing parties find this hard to 
accept, or even understand." The Privy Council's decision is annexed to Gold and Resource 
Developments (NZ) Ltd v Doug Hood Ltd [2000] 3 ZLR 3 18, at p 338. 68 Appeals on questions of law are governed in New Zealand by clause 5 of the econd chedule to the Arbitration Act 1996. By virtue of s.6(2) of the Arbitration Act 1996, the Second chedule 
of the Act applies to domestic arbitrations, unless the parties agree otherwise, but only applies to international arbitrations (as defined) if the parties so agree. In England, Wales and Northern 
Ireland, s.69(1) of the Arbitration Act 1996 (UK) provides: "Unless otherwise agreed by the 
parties, a party to arbitral proceedings may (upon notice to the other parties and to the tribunal) appeal to the court on a question of law arising out of an award made in the proceedmgs ." (This 
author's emphasis). 
69 The Report of the Advisory Committee of the Department of Industry ('the DAC') on the 
Arbitration Bill of February 1996, para 223. Hereafter "The DAC Report". See also V.V. Veeder, England in ICCA Handbook 53 (Arb. Supp. 23, March 1997). 70 3 July 1985, No.46; Supreme Court of enegal; 3 ICSID Review, ( I 988) 2 Foreign Investment Law Journal 356, with note by B. Diokhane at pp. 352-355; ( 1989) 2 ASA Bulletin 230 
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more often that not an arbitrator acting as amiable compositeur will base his or 
her decision on the law, since in the majority of cases the law provides the 
equitable result. 71 Suppose an arbitrator was to find that the equities of a case are 
in equilibrium, but the law favours one party. Accordingly, the arbitrator bases 
his or her decision upon a dry proposition of law. This is an application of the 
equitable maxim that where the equities are equal the law prevails. In Pearson v 
-7 
Clark-, the former Supreme Court of New Zealand held that in such 
circumstances an appeal could lie against a decision made by a Magistrate 
empowered to decide according equity and good conscience. This was despite 
the fact that, like amiable composition, a decision in equity and good conscience 
did not require absolute adherence to the law. 73 In such a case, the losing party 
could be heard to say, "If the arbitrator had got the law right, I would have won! " 
Therefore, instead of considering an amiable composition clause to be an 
exclusion agreement, and simply incompatible with a right of appeal , a Court 
asked for leave to appeal could simply enquire whether there are any discernible 
questions of law for it to determine (i.e. has the arbitrator based his or her 
decision in law?). 74 The difficulty with this approach is illustrated by a number 
of French decisions regarding the duties of an amiable compositeur. 
In Soubaigne v Limmeareds Skogar,75 the Paris Court of Appeals stated 
that an amiable compositeur was required to "seek the fairest solution."76 
Notwithstanding this, the Court refused to set the award aside for an alleged 
failure by the arbitrators to comply with that mission (the award contained no 
reference to equity), as they "had necessarily been guided equally by rules of law 
and by their sense of equity." However, in Ha/bout et societe Matenec Hg v 
71 As Rene David puts it, " .. . they see the law as a kind of ratio scripta and do not find any good reason for departing from its application in particular cases." Above, fn 12, at p. 335 . 72 (1864)Mac 136, atp .143 . 
73 In relation to the same power under the later Magistrates' Courts Act 1908 (s.92), the Court was held not to be able disregard the directions of a Statute: see Karon" Borough v Buxton [ I 918] NZLR 730; [1918] GLR472. 
74 In England and ew Zealand, leave to appeal will be required from the Court in the absence of the consent of both parties : see s. 69(2) of the Arbitration Act 1996 (UK) and clause 5( I) of the Second Schedule to the Arbitration Act 1996 ( Z). 75 CA Paris, 15 March 1984, 1985 REV. ARB. 285 ; al so see the commentary by Eric Loqum, Pouvoirs et devoirs de I 'amiable compositeur. A propos de trois arrets de la Cour d 'appel de Paris, at 199. 
76 See also Unijet S. A. v SA . R. L. international Business Relations Ltd (!. B. R.), CA Paris 6 May 1988, 1989 REV. ARB. 83 , and Eric Loquin 's note. 
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Epoux Henin, -7 the Cour de Cassation held that an amiable compositeur deciding 
by reference to rules of law must justify the conformity of equity with those 
rules. Similarly, an arbitrator was held to have disregarded his powers of 
amiable composition where he simply multiplied the number of days delay 
attributable to a company by the highest daily penalty set under the relevant 
contract without any reference to the equitable considerations that led him to that 
result. 78 Also illustrating the predominance of equitable considerations, the 
French Code of Civil Procedure requires an amiable compositeur to give reasons 
for an award as an element of due process, but that obligation does not 
necessitate the tribunal to set out any basis at law. 79 These decisions indicate that 
an amiable composition clause should indeed be considered to exclude an appeal 
on a question of law. In order to comply with his or her brief, an amiable 
compositeur must give primacy to equitable considerations. If the law is relied 
upon, such reliance must be justified in terms of those considerations. Therefore, 
even if the arbitrator gets the law wrong, the result can be said to be ba ed on 
what the arbitrator considers to be fair - something that is not amenable to 
review. This fact still does not entirely overcome the example above where the 
equities are equal. 80 Also, the exclusionary interpretation requires the Courts to 
give precedence to the parties' choice of amiable composition, as opposed to the 
appeal right. Party autonomy should dictate that an express choice prevails over 
an excludable right that applies only by virtue of Statute. 81 However, as the 
following decision will illustrate, if the parties wish to avoid their amiable 
composition clause being read down in order to fit with a pre-existing right of 
appeal, they should exclude the right expressly. 82 
77 15 February 200 I, 2 Ch. civ.; (200 I) Revue D 'Arbitrage 135. 78 SARL Societe grenobloise d 'investissemenl v Eurovia et al. ( 18 October 200 I, 2e Ch. civ. , 
Cour de Cassation) ; (200 I) Revue D 'Arbitrage 922 . 
79 See Articles 1471 , 1480, 1502 and 1504, and Stapem SA . v Boccard .A. (UnrepoI1ed, 19 
November 1991 , Cour de Cassation, Premiere chambre civile, Appeal o. 90-1 2.666 - no 
obligation to set out the legal grounds on which a party was held responsible for a breach of contract). Cited in Craig, Park and Paulsson, above fn I 0, at p.354, note 24. 80 But presumably, the law relied upon will have some justification in terms of fairness. If not, an amiable compositeur should not follow it blindly. 
81 See above, fn 68 . 
82 But in England , the partie to a domestic arbitration agreement can only agree to exclude the 
Courts ' jurisdiction to hear an appeal on a question of law if the exclusion agreement is made after the commencement of the arbitral proceedings: s. 87( I) Arbitration Act 1996 (UK). 
In A 's Company Ltd v Dagger,83 the plaintiff sought to challenge the 
awards of an engineer arbitrator in favour of the defendants, who had performed 
earthworks under contract with the plaintiff. The plaintiff sought leave to appeal 
under clause 5 of the Second Schedule to the Arbitration Act 1996, and in the 
alternative sought to have the awards set aside under Article 34 of the First 
Schedule. The principal complaints were that the arbitrator had committed 
procedural errors, including the investigation of issues outside the scope of the 
reference to arbitration and the late admission of prejudicial evidence, and had 
wrongly interpreted the earthworks contract. The parties had expressly agreed 
pursuant to Article 28(3) of the First Schedule that the arbitrator would be 
empowered to act as amiable compositeur. However, it is clear that the parties 
did not comprehend the significance of their election. 84 The evidence tendered to 
the High Court established that the parties had both contemplated a right of 
appeal. Because the arbitration was a domestic one, the Second Schedule to the 
Act (including the right of appeal) applied in the absence of an agreement to the 
contrary. 85 The parties therefore chose not to exclude the prospect, but according 
to Baragwanath J, did not go so far as to allow for an appeal without leave. 86 
Ultimately, Baragwanath J set the awards aside. The procedural errors were such 
that the principles of natural justice were breached. In that sense, the ultimate 
result is uncontroversial. Like any arbitrator, an amiable compositeur is bound 
by the fundamental rules of procedural fairness. 87 Failure to adhere to those rules 
will provide grounds for setting an award aside or refusing enforcement and 
recognition, separately from any right of appeal. 88 
83 Unreported, High Court, Auckland, M 1482-SDOO, 7 March 2003 . 
84 See the statement of Baragwanath J to this effect at para [ 125]. 
85 Section 6(2)(b) of the Arbitration Act 1996. 
86 Pursuant to clause 5( 1 )(a) and (b) of the Second Schedule the parties may agree to a right of 
appeal on a question of law before or after the award is rendered. In such a case, th leave of the 
Court is not required. 
87 See Article 18 of the UNClTRAL Model Law (virtually replicated in Article 18 of the First 
Schedule to the Arbitration Act 1996). For the applicability of the rules of due process to an 
amiable compositeur, see Saline d 'Einville v Compagnie des Sa/ins du Midi, (CA Paris, I I July 
1991 ); 1991 REV. ARB. 671 , and observations by E. Loquin. 
88 In New Zealand, the Arbitration Act 1996 expressly deems a breach of the rules of natural 
justice to be contrary to the public policy of New Zealand, and hence a ground for etting aside 
an award under Art 34(2)(b )(ii) of the First Schedule to the Act, or for refusing recognition or 
enforcement of an award under Article 36( I )(b )(ii) of that Schedule - see Articles 34 ( 6)(b) and 
36 (3)(b) of the same Schedule. Articles 34 and 36 of the UNCITRAL Model Law have much the 
same effect, as do various other domestic provisions. 
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That His Honour granted leave to appeal in the face of an amiable 
composition clause and proceeded to determine the proper legal construction of 
various clauses in the earthworks contract is more controversial. As discussed 
above, a true reference to amiable composition should have the effect of 
excluding an appeal on a question of law, since the arbitrator in such a case has 
the mission of seeking out the most equitable solution. But after surveying the 
various meanings attributed to amiable composition clauses, His Honour stated 
in obiter: 
"Here, where the parties have agreed on a right of appeal to the Court, the extreme 
interpretation of amiable composition as excluding legal rights cannot be adopted. 
( .. .) 
In my view the Art 28(3) 'amiable compositeur' approach must result in modification of 
the strict language of the written contract to the extent of any inconsistency with a fair 
and equitable result. Had the procedure been fair, the Court would have been slow to 
interfere with the assessment of the chosen expert, even if a lawyer 's strict construction 
might lead to another result. "89 
This restricted interpretation appears to correlate with the treatment of 
equity clauses by the English Courts prior to the Arbitration Act 1996 (UK). As 
discussed above, the effect of those cases was to uphold a clause that could be 
construed as merely enabling an arbitrator to disregard technicalities and strict 
constructions, but not one that sought to permit an arbitrator to decide extra-
legally. Like A 's Company Ltd v Dagger, those decisions were driven by 
concerns about the compatibility of an an1iable composition clause with the 
supervisory role of the Appellate Courts. What exactly the limited approach 
would enable an arbitrator to do is a matter of some controversy. This is 
particularly so given the requirement for all arbitrators under Article 28(4) of the 
First Schedule (replicating the UNCITRAL Model Law) to "decide in 
accordance with the terms of any contract".90 (The implications of Article 28(4) 
for amiable composition are discussed separately below). 91 
89 Above fn 83 , at paras [ 142] and [ l 46]. 
9° Compare Article 17(2) of the ICC Rules of Conciliation and Arbitration 1998, wh ich provides 
that: "In al I cases the Arbitral Tribunal shall take account of the provisions of the contract and the 
relevant trade usages." (Author's emphasis). 
91 See Part Ill B "Duty to Decide in Accordance with the Terms of the Contract and to Have 
Regard to Trade Usages". 
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Baragwanath J clearly placed reliance on what His Honour expressed as 
" ... the parties' stipulation for the right to seek leave to appeal to the Court ... " 
describing this as "a powerful pointer towards a conclusion that the parties 
intended legal rights to result from the award."92 But if a right to seek leave was 
all that was contemplated, that is available in any domestic arbitration unless 
excluded. 93 One interpretation of this case is that an amiable composition clause 
will be read down to conform with a right of appeal in any case where the parties 
do not expressly exclude the right. That interpretation would not sit well with 
the DAC's view that a reference to amiable composition would serve as an 
exclusion per se. However, this case can also be viewed as involving the clash of 
two express and conflicting intentions. According to the evidence, the parties did 
wish to allow for the right of appeal, which is not compatible with the full 
meaning of amiable composition. Viewed in this way, A 's Company Ltd v 
Dagger can be understood as a case involving an express stipulation for an 
appeal. Since amiable composition can be attributed a more restricted meaning, 
then it will necessarily yield. With respect to Baragwanath J, the real confusion 
surrounds His Honour's finding that leave to appeal was required. If the parties 
did in fact agree on a right of appeal, then leave is not required. 94 The 
requirement for leave under clause 5(1)(c) of the Second Schedule is invoked 
only where the parties have either failed to turn their minds to the question of an 
appeal, or have agreed not to exclude the prospect. In this author ' s view, a mere 
agreement not to exclude the prospect of an appeal should not take precedence 
over an express stipulation for amiable composition. If a party seeks leave in 
such circumstances, the Court should simply refuse leave on the basis that on a 
proper interpretation of amiable composition, no question of law arises. Should a 
party take issue with the procedure or scope of the arbitration, for example, 
Articles 34 and 36 of the First Schedule will enable a Court to set an award aside, 
or refuse recognition or enforcement. However, reiterating what was stated 
above, practitioners wishing to avoid these types of arguments should expressly 
exclude the prospect of an appeal on a point of Jaw. If New Zealand is the 
arbitral situs, an exclusion will only be necessary in a domestic case, since the 
92 Above fn 83 , at para [144]. 
93 Section 6(2)(b) ofthe Arbitration Act 1996. 
94 See clause 5( I )(a) of the Second Schedule to the Arbitration Act 1996. 
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right of appeal contained in the Second Schedule to the Arbitration Act 1996 
only applies to international arbitrations if the parties agree. 95 Because amiable 
composition is much more prevalent in civil law countries (and, as will be 
discussed below, apparently the United States), it is more likely to be used in 
international arbitrations. In fact, A 's Company Ltd v Dagger illustrates how 
little New Zealand parties understand the concept. But if the seat of arbitration is 
England, for example, the right of appeal is not dependent upon whether the 
parties are domestic or international. Thus, despite the DAC's assertion that an 
amiable composition clause would exclude the right of appeal, practitioners 
would be well advised to do so specifically. This is especially so given the 
English Courts' previous treatment of equity clauses. 
D. The Conciliation Element 
1. Distinction between amiable composition and mediation in the arbitral 
context 
As mentioned above, amiable composition originally contemplated a 
conciliation process and it is important to recognise that the modern meaning of 
the term is context driven.96 Take the term out of an arbitral or adjudicative 
context and it may assume its original meaning. Remove the need for a decision, 
and a definition corresponding to mediation is possible. While the goal of 
arbitration is the handing down of an enforceable award, the goal of mediation 
can be described as "a voluntary and responsible agreement between the parties, 
reached and facilitated with the help of an independent third party via a clear 
95 Section 6(2)(a). Article l (3) of the First Schedule provides: 
"(3) An arbitration is international if-
(a) The parties to an arbitration agreement have, at the time of the conclusion of that 
agreement, their places of business in different States, or 
(b) One of the following places is situated outside the State in which the parties have their 
places of business: 
(i) The place of arbitration if determined in , or pursuant to, the arbitration agreement: 
(ii) Any place where a substantial part of the obligations of any commercial or other 
relationship is to be performed or the place with which the subject-matter of the dispute is most 
closely connected, or 
(c) The parties have expressly agreed that the subject-matter of the arbitration agreement 
relates to more than one country." 
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negotiation structure ('principled negotiation')".97 The latter goal correlates with 
the literal translation of the term as "friendly settlor" or "author of friendly 
compromise", as well as the canonist aim of re-establishing harmony between the 
parties by engendering understanding between them. In fact, a simple search of 
the Internet reveals the term referring to a mediation process. For example, the 
Office of the Amiable compositeur (Bureau de I 'Amiable compositeur) 
established in 1995 by the Government of the Republic and canton of Geneva 
provides a mediation service for labour conflicts regarding persons who hold 
diplomatic privileges and immunities. If the mediation fails , the parties are free 
to address the competent Courts.98 Another example of the term being used to 
refer to a mediation process is contract No. II (international) of the International 
Council of Hide and Skin Sellers ' Association and of the International Council of 
Tanners, which contemplates arbitration "failing amiable composition".99 Of 
course, such an interpretation is perfectly open upon reference to the term's 
literal translation, and serves to reiterate the importance of context. 
However, the latter example also serves to illustrate the limited meaning 
attributed to the term by English lawyers. For them, an arbitrator empowered to 
decide as an amiable compositeur was a contradiction in terms. The reasons for 
this limited interpretation are apparent in the following quote from Sir Michael 
Kerr in 1993: 
"If the function of an amiable compositeur is merely to mediate and conciliate, then he 
is not an arbitrator. If his function includes the power to impose a compromise 
settlement upon the parties as a binding decision which disregards the legal position, 
then he would equally not be acting as an arbitrator according to lmv, and his 'award ' 
Id . k b . .d ,,JOO wou ns emg set as, e. 
96 Rubino-Sammartano states that the assimilation " lives under the rule magis valeat quam 
pereat, i.e. merely to avoid the collapse of the parties intention, and is not the pure and full 
meaning of this expression": See above fn 7, at p.15. 
97 Klaus Peter Berger, " Integration of Mediation Elements into Arbitration : ' Hybrid' Procedures 
and ' Intuitive ' Mediation by International Arbitrators" (2003) 19(3) Arb. /nt 'l 387, at p.390, 
citing the description of the 13-day peace negotiations between President Sadat and Prime 
Minister Begin at Camp David in September 1978 in J. Carter, Keeping the Faith ( 1978), p.15 et 
seq. 
98 See the website of the Permanent Mission of Switzerland to the United Nations Office and to 
other international organisations in Geneva: <http://www.eda.admin.ch/geneva_ m1ss/e/home> 
(last accessed 22 September 2005). Information on the Office of the Amiable compositeur is to 
be located by following the links entitled " Privileges, immunities (Manual)" and " Labour (law)" . 
99 See David, above, fn 12, at p. 112, fn 60. 
10° Kerr, "Equity Arbitration in England" ( 1993) 2(4) Am. Rev. lnt 'l Arb. 377, at pp. 383-384. 
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The second sentence reflects the former English requirement that an arbitrator 
"apply a fixed and recognisable system of law" and the apparent policy of 
English law that an arbitrator could not "be allowed to apply some different 
[extra-legal] criterion such as the view of the individual arbitrator or umpire on 
abstract justice or equitable principles ... " 101 Section 46(1)(b) of the Arbitration 
Act 1996 (UK) now allows the parties to an arbitration to confer on an arbitral 
tribunal the power to decide "in accordance with such other considerations as are 
agreed by them or determined by the tribunal." Through this provision, the 
parties to an arbitration agreement can now free an arbitrator to decide according 
to his or her own notions of equity, without regard to any particular system of 
law. 102 Consequently, there is no longer any English impediment to amiable 
composition being given the broader meaning attributed to it in France. 
However, prior to 1996 that was not the case, and it is arguable that Kerr was 
searching for a definition that could be given effect under English law when he 
stated that the only "natural" interpretation of amiable composition was a staged 
process "whereby mediation/conciliation are tried first and are followed by an 
arbitration if they fail. " 103 That is a reference to the hybrid technique known as 
"med-arb", which is apparently gaining popularity in the United States 
particularly. 104 
2. Distinction between amiable composition and med-arb 
Med-arb is a combination of mediation and arbitration, which seeks to 
utilise the advantages of both procedures. In its original format, the same person 
would act as mediator, and if necessary, arbitrator. Where a mediated agreement 
is not possible, this approach may produce efficiencies, since the parties do not 
need to edify a separate arbitrator regarding the issues in dispute. 105 However, 
there are a number of well-trammelled procedural and practical concerns 
101 Per Megaw J in Orion Compania Espana/a de Seguros v Belfort Maatschappij Voor Algemene 
Ver:::ekgringeen, above fn 30 at p. 264 and confirmed in that respect by Eagle Star Insurance Co 
Ltd. v Yuval Insurance Co. Ltd, above fn 34. 
102 The DAC Report confirms this broad effect at para 223. 
103 Kerr, above fn I 00, at p.384. 
104 See James T. Peter, " Med-Arb in International Arbitration" ( 1997) 8 Am. Rev. Jnt 'I Arb. 83, at 
p. 83 . 
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regarding this technique. 106 In Acorn Farms Ltd v Schnuriger 107, those 
apprehensions led Fisher J to observe that the following five precautions would 
seem necessary: 
"(a) It must be made clear to the parties from the beginning that if there is no 
agreement the mediator/arbitrator will be imposing a binding solution. 
(b) The mediator/arbitrator may not receive information without the knowledge of 
both parties(. . .). For all practical purposes this rules out the possibility of caucusing at 
any stage of the process. 
(c) The parties must be warned at the outset that anything said to the 
mediator/arbitrator could be used against that party as the basis for an award, this 
includes offers and confidential information disclosed for negotiating purposes. [This 
avoids the med-arbitrator being put in the impossible position of having to 
compartmentalise or "build a Chinese wall" in his or her mind, but may also discourage 
candour at the mediation stage]. 108 
(d) The mediator/arb itrator must avoid the expression of final views until all 
evidence and argument is complete (. .. ). 
(e) If the process moves into arbitration mode, both parties must be given full 
opportunity to present their cases (. . .). This includes a clear indication when the 
process switches from mediation to arbitration and the timing and process for 
presenting evidence and argument (. . .) ". 109 
The fundamental rules of procedural fairness that drive these precautions are 
applicable to all arbitrators alike. For example, while generally absolved from 
adhering to the law, an amiable compositeur will still be bound to treat the 
parties equally and give each the full opportunity of presenting their case. 110 
Amiable composition is not med-arb. Unlike amiable composition, med-
arb does not include the power to decide other than according to law. As stated 
105 See Peter, above fn I 04, at pp. 88-89. 
106 For a discussion of those concerns, see Peter, above fn I 04 at pp.92-98 ; and Berger, above fn 
97, at pp. 392-394. 
107 [2003] 3 NZLR 121. Although Fisher J referred to "co-med-arb", that format actually 
involves different people acting as mediator and arbitrator. They conduct a joint fact-finding 
hearing, which is followed by mediation in the absence of the arbitrator. If no mediated 
agreement is possible, the arbitrator takes over and ultimately renders an award: Christian 
BUhring-Uhle, "Co-Med-Arb Technique Holds Promise for Getting Best of Both Worlds" ( 1992) 
3(1) World Arb. & Mediation Rep. 21. 
108 See BUhring-Uhle, Arbitration and Mediation in International Business (1996), p. 367. 
109 Acorn Farms, above fn I 07 at p. 131 . 
110 See Article I 8 of the UNCITRAL Model Law. For the applicability of the rules of due 
process to an amiable compositeur, see Saline d'Einville v Compagnie des Sa/ins du Midi, (CA 
Paris, 11 July I 99 I) ; 1991 REV. ARB. 671, and observations by E. Loquin. 
above, Kerr's preferred definition probably suffers from the jaundiced view 
English law then took to such an approach. While parties are free to choose to 
resolve their dispute by med-arb, they must do so in an informed way. In ICC 
Case No. 3938, the arbitral tribunal held, inter alia, that an amiable compositeur 
may not act as mediator without the express authorisation of the parties. 111 A 
simple reference to amiable composition would seem insufficient to indicate 
assent to such a fundamental change in procedure, and as will be discussed below 
an amiable compositeur has no more freedom with regards to procedure than any 
other arbitrator does. 112 
3. Joint mandate to settle? 
Mauro Rubino-Sammartano describes the amiable compositeur as having 
a joint mandate to settle, and refers to the Italian notion of arbitrato irrituale 11 3 
whereby an agent is jointly appointed to settle the parties ' differences. 114 The 
problem with such an interpretation in the current context, as the author 
acknowledges, is that like mediation it does not fit with a requirement on the part 
of the amiable compositeur to decide. To settle is not the same as making a 
judicial decision. In such cases, the Italian Courts have construed the role of an 
amiable compositeur as being to decide ex aequo et bono. 11 5 Nevertheless, 
drafts-people should be aware of this interpretation, as a clause empowering a 
person to "act" as amiable compositeur (as opposed to decide) may be treated 
very differently in Italy and Spain. 11 6 The notion of settlement may also have 
some bearing on the scope of an amiable compositeur's decision-making powers. 
As Goldman put it, " ... the amiable compositeur may decide all what the parties 
may agree, when settling their dispute ." 117 
111 (1984) 111 Clune/ 926. 
11 2 See Part III A " Must He or She Have Regard to the Law At All?" 
113 Informal arbitration 
11 4 Above, fn 7, at p. 13 . 
11 5 See Parisi v Parisi [ 1956] Rep. Foro. It. 1957, 174, 24 . 
11 6 Rubino-Sammartano states that the Spanish arbitraje informal, impropio o fibre has a similar 
meaning and is valid as a contract: Above fn 7, at p.13 . 
11 7 B. Goldman, Le droit applicable a/a Convention BIRD, in Cours de droit du commerce 
international (International Trade Lectures), Les Cours du droit I 970, 1971. Cited m Rubino-
Sammartano, above fn 7, at p.14. 
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4. Re-establishing harmony in commercial dealings 
Like mediation, this flexibility in decision-making enables "a move away 
from the typical forensic focus on legal positions towards a focus on the interests 
underlying the dispute and the necessity of a future-oriented solution."' 18 This 
sort of flexibility can be particularly useful in long-term contracts, where an 
ongoing relationship may be important, and the law may be ill-equipped to deal 
with such complex agreements.' 19 During research for a thesis on the subject, 
Eric Loquin found 3 5 examples of amiable composition arbitration, of which the 
majority were in relation to long-term contracts - such as turnkey industrial plant 
contracts, raw materials purchase or production, economic development, or 
transfer of technology contracts. 120 Stressing the amiable compositeur's duty to 
re-establish harmony in commercial dealings, Loquin states: 
"The parties in agreeing to submit themselves to an arbitration by amiable composition, 
give up certain of their rights accorded under law, in order to allow the arbitrator to 
provide for them the most reconciliato,y solution. "121 
The duty to seek out the most conciliatory solution IS examined separately 
below. 122 
E. Preliminary Conclusions as to Meaning 
At this stage, the following points about amiable composition can be deduced: 
• The term has been corrupted from its original meaning, and IS therefore 
context specific and highly contestable; 
• Outside the arbitral context, the term may contemplate a procedure akin to 
mediation, or a joint mandate to settle; 
118 See Berger, above fn 97, at p. 397. 
119 See Craig, Park and Paulsson, above fn 10, at p.35 1. 
120 Loquin , above fn 7, at pp.145-154. Cited in Craig, Park and Paulsson, above fn I 0, at p. 35 1. 
121 Loquin, above fn 7, as translated in Lew (ed), Contempora,y Problems in International 
Arbitration (Centre for Commercial Law Studies, Queen Mary College, University of London, 
1986) pp.70-71 , fn 66. 
122 See Part III D " Duty to Seek the Most Conciliatory Solution?" 
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• A reference to amiable composition is not a reference to med-arb; 
• In an arbitral context, the term has been equated with an ability to decide by 
reference to an arbitrator ' s conceptions of justice and fairness, and appears to 
require an arbitrator to seek out the fairest solution; 
• The term does not require the application of transnational principles; 
• When used together with an express choice of law, the term will require 
initial recourse to that law; 
• The full meaning of the term is incompatible with a right of appeal; 
• The term may contemplate a duty to seek out the most conciliatory solution 
where the parties have an ongoing relationship. 
F. Consequences for Practitioners 
The ambiguities highlighted to date should ring alarm bells for any 
practitioners considering an authorisation of the kind described in Article 28(3) 
of the Model Law. Section 46(1)(b) of the English Act deliberately avoided using 
the Latin and French terms contained in Article 28(3) in the interests of 
simplicity, as well as to avoid the historical baggage they carry. 123 While the 
New Zealand provision defines amiable composition as the power to decide 
"according to considerations of general justice and fairness", 124 the confusion in 
A 's Company Ltd v Dagger suggests that parties should seek to further define the 
anticipated role of the arbitrator in plain language before proceeding. 125 An 
amiable compositeur' s powers are no wider than the authority granted by the 
parties. For example, in Himpurna California Energy Ltd (Bermuda) v PT 
(Persero) Perusahaan Listruik Negara (Indonesia) 126 the parties to an energy 
sales contract authorised the arbitrators to disregard strict rules of law only where 
they would be "inconsistent with the spirit of [the] Contract and the underlying 
intent of the parties." The parties should avoid confusing translations such as 
123 The DAC Report, above fn 59. 
124 Article 28(3) of the First Schedule to the Arbitration Act 1996 provides : 
"The arbitral tribunal shall decide ex aequo et bono or as amiable compositeur (according to 
considerations of general justice and fairness) only if the parties have expressly authorised it to 
do so." (This author ' s emphasis). 
125 See the recommendation of the UNCITRAL Secretariat to this effect at para 36 of the 
Explanatory Note to the Model Law: United Nations document A/40/1 7, Annex I. 
126 Ad Hoe Final Award of 4 May 1999, (2000) XXV YBCA 11. 
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"equitable mediator". 127 Parties should be aware that the use of words with 
established meanings such as "in accordance with equity and good conscience" 
could be interpreted restrictively to require an arbitrator to comply with the 
directions of a Statute. 128 If the parties wish for the arbitrator to start with a legal 
foundation, they should say so, or make an express choice of law. If they wish to 
avoid their reference to amiable composition being heavily read down, they 
should expressly exclude any right of appeal. 
In time, "amiable compositeur" may attract a settled meanmg m the 
common law like the term force majeure. 129 A 's Company Ltd v Dagger 
illustrates that is not yet the case, although Baragwanath J's reference to 
European jurisprudence is to be applauded. 
III. WHAT IS AN AMIABLE COMPOSITEUR REQUIRED TO DO (AS 
OPPOSED TO PERMITTED TO DO)? 
A. Must He or She Have Regard to the Law At All? 
Assuming the parties confer the powers of amiable composition without setting 
any constraints of the type discussed above, all arbitrators nevertheless owe a 
paramount duty to the parties - to make every effort to ensure that the award is 
enforceable. 130 To fulfil this obligation, an amiable compositeur will be required 
to look to the law. 
Firstly, the arbitrator will need to be satisfied that the law governing the 
arbitration (usually the law of the arbitral situs) allows for amiable composition, 
or at least does not preclude it. 131 Most laws require the parties to expressly opt 
127 See Craig, Park and Paulsson, above fn I Oat pp. I I 3. 
128 See fn 73 above. 
129 Craig, Park and Paulsson, above fn I O at pp.113-1 14, suggest that the term is already the best 
way to make the authorisation. 
130 An explicit reference to this duty is found in Article 26 of the ICC Rules of Conciliation and 
Arbitration 1998, which provides that " In all matters not expressly provided for in these Rules, 
the International Court of Arbitration and the arbitrator shall act in the spirit of these Rules and 
shall make every effort to make sure that the award is enforceable at law." See also Article 32.2 
of the Arbitration Rules of the London Court of International Arbitration. 
13 1 In fact, there is authority for the recognition of an amiable composition award rendered in a 
country (Sweden) that does not expressly recognise the practice: see A.B. Carl Engstrom v N. V. 
Kunstmesthandel vorheen Hulshof (1934) NYTT JURISDIKT ARKIV 491 , cited in J. Paulsson, 
"The Role of Swedish Courts in Transnational Commercial Arbitration" ( I 981) 21 Virginia 
Journal of International Law 211 , at pp. 228-229. 
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for amiable composition, 132 as do the rules of most arbitral institutions. 133 In 
view of the criticisms of amiable composition discussed below, the concept is 
less defensible where the parties do not choose it. However, the rules of the 
Netherlands Arbitration Institute distinguish between domestic and international 
arbitrations. In the former, the parties can opt-out of amiable composition, but in 
the latter, they must expressly opt-in. 134 Article 53 of the Rules of the China 
International Economic Trade and Arbitration Commission (CIETAC) states 
that: 
" ... the arbitration tribunal shall independently and impartially make its arbitration 
award in accordance with the facts of the case, the law and the terms of the contracts, 
international practices and the principle of reasonableness and fairness." 
According to Lew, this provision continues the Chinese tradition of tribunals 
deciding as amiable compositeurs regardless of any election by the parties. 135 
For this to be the case, the apparently concurrent requirement to decide m 
accordance with the law would have to be subordinated to the "principle of 
reasonableness and fairness." Such a reading of the Article may reflect the fact 
that in China the law ( or "fa") has traditionally been viewed as an inferior and 
last recourse for the resolution of disputes. 136 Whether or not Article 53 could be 
modified by agreement is unclear. 137 But should an arbitrator act as amiable 
compositeur without authorisation, this will provide grounds for setting aside or 
132 For example, see Art. 28(3) of the UNCITRAL Model Law (now adopted in 45 countries); 
Art. 1497 of the French New Code of Civil Procedure; Art. I 054(3) of the Netherlands Code of 
Civil Procedure; Art. 1700(1) ofthe Belgian Judicial Code (Law of 19 May 1998); Art. 187(2) of 
the Swiss Private International Law Act; Art. I 051 (3) of the German ZPO (Law of 22 December 
1997). 
133 See Art. 17(3) of the ICC Rules of 1998; Art. 22.4 of the LCIA Rules ; Art. 28(3) of the 
American Arbitration Association Rules; Art.24(3) of the Stockholm Chamber of Commerce 
Rules of 1999. Art. 42(3) of the International Convention on the Settlement of Investment 
Disputes 1961 similarly requires the parties to expressly agree on the Tribunal deciding ex aequo 
et bona. 
134 Article 45 of the Netherlands Arbitration Institute Rules. 
135 See Julian D M Lew QC, Loukas A Mistelis, Stefan M Kroll Comparative International 
Commercial Arbitration (Kluwer Law International , The Hague, The Netherlands, 2003), at 
p.473. 
136 See Tsao, "Equity in Chinese Customary Law" in A Newman (ed) Essays in Jzmsprudence in 
Honour of Roscoe Pound (Bobbs-Merrill , 1962), at p. 32. 
137 See Yan, "The New Arbitration Rules of the China International Economic Trade and 
Arbitration Commission", (1995) 11 Arb. lnt'l 183 ; Houzhi , " Is There an Expanding Culture that 
favors Combining Arbitration with Conciliation or Other ADR Procedures?" ( 1998) ICCA 
Congress series no. 8, IOI. 
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refusing enforcement, 138 although such grounds cannot be used in order to mask 
a challenge of the merits. 139 
Provided the law govermng the arbitration allows for amiable 
composition, and any necessary election has been made by the parties, whether 
or not the enforcing State allows for amiable composition should be irrelevant. 
The only ground for refusal open to a Court under the New York Convention in 
such circumstances is that enforcement would be contrary to the enforcing 
State's public policy under Article V(2)(b). 140 The widely held view is that this 
Article refers to the enforcing forum's international, rather than domestic public 
policy. 141 Enforcement is only to be refused where it would "violate the forum 
State's most basic notions of morality and justice." 142 In the Deutsche 
Schachtbau case, the English Court of Appeal upheld the Swiss award based on 
"internationally accepted principles of law governing contractual relations" on 
the basis that the choice was open to the arbitrators under the governing rules. 
Provided amiable composition is similarly open, no issues of public policy 
should conceivably arise. 
138 In France, such an action would constitute a failure by the arbitrator to comply with the terms 
of his or her brief, a ground for setting aside under Art. 1502(3) of the New Code of Civil 
Procedure; see also Art. 34(2)(a)(iv) of the Model Law, which provides: 
"(2) An arbitral award may be set aside by [the relevant Court] only if: 
( ... ) 
(iv) the composition of the arbitral tribunal or the arbitral procedure was not in 
accordance with the agreement of the parties, unless such agreement was in conflict with 
a provision of this Law from which the parties cannot derogate, or, failing such 
agreement, was not in accordance with this Law" . (This author ' s emphasis). 
As Article 28(3) is a provision of the Law from which the parties cannot derogate, failure to 
adhere to it will invoke Article 34(2)(a)(iv) regardless of any agreement to the contrary. In 
relation, to recognition and enforcement, see Art. 36(1 )(a)(iv) of the Model Law, which replicates 
Art. Y( I )(d) of the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards 
1958 (the 'New York Convention ' ). 
139 See International Standard Electric Corporation (US) v Bridas Sociedad Anonima Petro/era, 
industrial y Comercial (1990) 745 Fed. Supp. l 72 ; the same grounds also failed in Inter-Arab 
Investment Guarantee Corporation v Banque Arabe et lnternationale d 'lnvestissements 
(Belgium , Cour d'appel Brussells, 24 January 1997); (1997) XXII YBCA 643. 
140 Art. V( I )(d) of the New York Convention only allows recognition or enforcement to be 
refused where the composition of the arbitral tribunal or the arbitral procedure was either in 
breach of the parties ' agreement, or fai I ing such agreement, was not in accordance with the law of 
the arbitral situs. 
14 1 Philippe Fouchard, L 'Arbitrage Commercial international (1965), p.995-996 noting that 
international public policy should not be confused with transnational public policy; and Lew, 
above fn 135, at p.721 (especially see fn 175). 
142 Parsons & Whillemore Overseas Co, Inc v Societe generate de / 'industrie du papier (RAKTA) , 
508 F 2d 969, I YBCA 205 ( 1976) (2d Cir, 1974). See also Resolution 2/2002 of the International 
Law Association, set out in A.A.P. Willy, Arbitration in New Zealand (2ed , LexisNexis, 
Wellington , 2003), at pp.141-142. 
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Once satisfied of his or her mandate as amiable compositeur, the 
arbitrator may or may not be required to determine the applicable law as a 
starting point. As discussed above, where the parties have made an express 
choice of law the arbitrator will generally start with the applicable law and 
attenuate its effects where considered equitable to do so. 143 Conversely, the 
parties may intend to exclude the application of any particular law. For example, 
a study by Sigvard Jarvin of 91 disputes in East-West relations referred to the 
ICC between 1980 and 1982, revealed that the parties "to a great extent" 
empowered the arbitrator to decide exclusively by reference to broad notions of 
faimess. 144 If the parties give no indication as to their preference, the arbitrator's 
first move should be to ask them. But what if they disagree? 
In the majority of cases, an amiable compositeur derives his or her 
powers from the agreement of the parties. Therefore, if the disagreement occurs 
prior to the conferral of those powers, their scope will be restricted to the extent 
of any consensus. Should no consensus be possible, but the parties still make the 
authorisation, then the arbitrator should proceed to determine the applicable law 
(whether national or a-national) by reference to the relevant conflict of laws rules 
and use that law as the foundation. Why? Because this is the more restricted 
interpretation of amiable composition, and after all , had the parties not agreed on 
amiable composition, the arbitrator would have had to decide purely in 
accordance with that law. One party could have insisted on that, but one party 
could not have unilaterally required the arbitrator to exclude any law. However, 
if the disagreement occurs after the conferral of the powers, the parties' 
statements of subjective intent can be viewed sceptically by the arbitrator, who 
should proceed to look for any objective indicators of the approach to be 
preferred. At a practical level though, practice indicates that in the absence of a 
stipulation to the contrary, an amiable compositeur will be free to either start 
143 See fn 66 above. 
144 Sigvard Jarvin , "Commercial Arbitration in East-West Relations : The Experience of the ICC 
Arbitration Court with regard to Choice of Law, Number of Arbitrators and Seat of Arbitration" 
( 1984) I 0( I) International Trade, Law and Practice I 17. 
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with a national law and exclude its effects if considered fair to do so, 145 or 
straight away seek out what he or she considers to be the fairest solution. 146 
Practice also indicates that in the majority of cases arbitrators opt for the 
former option. After all, laws are generally designed to achieve justice so that the 
legal and equitable result will often converge. As David has put it: 
"Jn the vast majority of cases amiables compositeurs do not intend to work out a 
compromise, but they feel bound to decide as is prescribed by the law; they see in the 
law a kind of ratio scripta and do not find any good reason from departing from its 
application in particular cases. The amiable compositeur is in fact a judge, but one who 
enjoys greater flexibility in adopting the solution which he regards as best, even though 
from a strictly legal point of view it may not be absolutely correct. ,,ir (References 
omitted). 
Thus, in a number of cases arbitrators have decided that the application of the 
legal rule corresponds with the equitable result. 148 In fact, it is arguable that the 
law is an indispensable consideration in determining the fair outcome. But 
where the arbitrator decides to step outside the law, there are some boundaries 
that he or she cannot cross. The difficulty is establishing with any certainty 
where they lie, and this uncertainty is tied up with the nebulous concept of public 
policy. 
A State may set aside or refuse to recognise or enforce an award that is 
contrary to that State's public policy. 149 Cognisant of his or her duty to 
endeavour to render an enforceable award, an arbitrator will therefore need to 
uphold those mandatory rules of law having a public policy character in both the 
forum State and the State where enforcement is likely to be sought. Of course, 
what is considered a matter of public policy will vary from country to country. 
For example, in ICC Case No. 4265, a sole arbitrator (empowered to act as 
145 See Italian party v Two Tunisian parties, ICC Case No. 5118, (1987) 114 J.D I. 1027; and 
ICC Case No. 3755 (1990) I (2) ICC Bulletin 25. Cited in Fouchard, Gaillard, Goldman, above 
fn 21 at p. 837, note 284. 
146 See Three European Companies v Four Tunisian Companies, above fu 65. 
147 David, above fn 12, at p. 335. 
148 See Company X (Italy) v Consultant A (Ireland) ( I 6 February 1998, Final Award in Case No. 
66/96, Italian Arbitration Association) ( 1999) XXIVa YBCA 183; Trading Co (Swit::.erland) v 
Manufacturer (US), Final Award in ICC Case No. 6955 of 1993, (1999) XXIVa YBCA 107; 
Company X (US) v Company Y (Italy) ( I December 1996, Final Award in Case No. 1795, 
Chamber of National and International Arbitration of Milan), ( 1999) XXIVa YBCA 206. 
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amiable compositeur) held that while Dutch law required damages to be paid for 
the unlawful termination of an exclusive agency contract, the law also required 
damages to be claimed within one year of the purported termination. The 
arbitrator refused to derogate from the limitation period on the basis that it was 
part of the rules of public order for The Netherlands. 150 But in Panalpina World 
Transports Holding AG (Switzerland) v la Societe Transco (The Republic of 
Congo), 151 the Paris Court of Appeals held that an arbitrator empowered as 
amiable compositeur was not bound to apply the Statute of Limitations. The 
Court of Appeals upheld the arbitrator's decision to allow a request for 
arbitration to be made 13 years late on the basis that the delay was attributable to 
the political situation in the Congo during the 1980's and 1990's. At the very 
least, an amiable compositeur is bound not "to take a decision contrary to an 
absolutely constraining law, particularly the rules concerning public order and 
morals." 152 This reflects Goldman's understanding of the concept as being 
coextensive with the ability of the parties to settle a dispute by consent. 153 If the 
parties cannot legally agree something, then an amiable compositeur cannot 
impose it by decision. 
The requirements of due process have often been considered a matter of 
public policy, 154 and as discussed above apply equally to all arbitrators. 155 
149 See Articles 34(2)(b)(ii) and 36(1)(b)(ii) of the UNCITRAL Model Law, and Art. V(2)(b) of 
the New York Convention. 
150 Exclusive Agent (Egypt) v Principal (The Netherlands), ICC Case No. 4265, ( I 984) J.D.I. 922. 
151 28 November 2002, Cour d'appel de Paris, (2003) REV ARB. 240. 
152 See ICC Case No. 1677 in 1975, ( 1978) III YBCA 216; and M. Blessing, "The New 
International Arbitration Law in Switzerland" ( 1988) 5 J. lnt '/ Arb. 9, at p. 64. 
153 See Goldman, above fn 117. 
154 See Firm P v Firm F (Ober/andesgericht of Hamburg, 3 April 1975) (1977) II YBCA 241; 
and Danish Buyer v German (FR) Seller ( Ober/andesgericht of Cologne, 10 June 1976) ( 1979) 
IV YBCA 258, which each rely on Art. V(2)(b) of the New York Convention. In Australia and 
New Zealand, a breach of the principles of procedural fairness ( or "natural justice") is expressly 
deemed to be contrary to public policy: Australia, s.19 of the International Arbitration Act 1974 
(Cth); New Zealand; Article 36(3)(b) of the First Schedule to the Arbitration Act 1996. However, 
see Pak/ito investment Ltd v K/ockner East Asia Ltd, Supreme Court of Hong Kong, 15 January 
1993 , (1994) XIX YBCA 664, where the Court held that public policy was irrelevant. The Court 
stated, "If the defendants do not establish that they were prevented from presenting their case 
[referring to Article V(l)(b)] , the question of public policy does not enter the equation. If the 
defendants established this ground then public policy is irrelevant." The Moscow City Court also 
held, in relation to the same defence in Article 34(2)(b )(ii) of the UNCITRAL Model Law, that a 
procedural infringement in the arbitral proceedings had no relevance to the notion of public 
policy (Unreported, Moscow City Court, Russian Federation, I O November 1994, reported on the 
CLOUT - Case Law on UNCITRAL Texts - database at <http://www.uncitral.org> (last 
accessed on I June 2005)). 
155 See fn 87 above. 
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Despite intimations to the contrary, 156 the powers of amiable composition are, in 
any event, concerned with the substantive rules of law, not procedure. Thus, 
Article 28(3) of the Model Law falls under the heading "Rules applicable to the 
substance of the dispute". Like any arbitrator, an amiable compositeur is bound 
to follow the procedure agreed by the parties, but has a discretion as to how to 
proceed failing any agreement. 157 That discretion, and the agreement of the 
parties, is subject to the fundamental procedural justice requirements known as 
the "Magna Carta of Arbitration". 158 The basic principle is that the parties 
should be treated with equality and given the full opportunity of presenting their 
respective cases. 159 Like a statutory tribunal, an amiable compositeur appointed 
under a specific Statute, or set of rules, is bound to adhere to the imperative 
provisions of that instrument, as it is that instrument from which he or she draws 
jurisdiction. Failure to do so will render any subsequent award in danger of 
setting aside, or non-recognition. 
B. Duty to Decide in Accordance with the Terms of the Contract and to 
Have Regard to Trade Usages 
One of the most controversial aspects of amiable composition regards 
whether or not it empowers arbitrators to disregard or moderate contractual 
provisions where they consider that their strict application would lead to 
inequity. 160 The orthodox view is that, as an expression of the parties ' collective 
will, the contract must be given effect. For example, ICC Case No. 3938 161 
involved a long-term contract for the sale and delivery of chemicals under which 
the price was to be adjusted by reference to the market price of a reference 
156 In ICC Case No. 4095 (unpublished), the arbitrators held that since they were not amiab le 
compositeurs they could not relieve a par1y alleging certain facts from hi s duty to prove them. 
Cited in Sigvard Jarvin, "The sources and limits of the arbitrator's powers" (1986) 2(2) Arb. Int 'I 
140, at p. 157. 
157 For example, see Art. I 9 of the UNCITRAL Model Law, and s.34( I) of the Arbitration Act 
1996 (UK). 
158 The ' Magna Carta of Arbitral Procedure ' is comprised of Articles 18 and 19 of the Model 
Law. See Seventh Secretariat Note, A/CN.9/264, A11 19, para I, at pp.582-583 of Howard M. 
Holtzmann and Joseph E. Neuhaus, A Guide To The UNCJTRAL Model law on International 
Commercial Arbitration: Legislative History and Comment (Kluwer, Deventer, The Netherlands, 
1989), and Summary Record, A/CN.9/SR.322, para 2 at pp.640-641. 
159 See Art. 18 of the Model Law. 
160 See the discuss ion in Fouchard, Gaillard, Goldman, above fn 2 1 at pp. 839-841. 
16 1 Buyer (France) v Supplier (The Netherlands), ICC Case No. 3938, (1984) J.D.I. 926 
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product, as published in a recognised trade magazine. When the magazine was 
prohibited from publishing the reference prices, the parties were left without a 
price index. Although empowered to decide as amiable compositeurs, the 
arbitral tribunal refused to substitute a new index system, stating that: 
" ... the considerations which may lead the arbitrator to correct distortions which may 
result from a strict application of the provisions of the law to the particular 
circumstances of the case are not valid with regard to the contract, which is a special 
set of rules resulting from the parties ' own intentions." 
In ICC Case No. 3267, the arbitral tribunal held that the duty of an arbitrator to 
apply the contract, even as amiable compositeur, was "a basic requirement for 
the security of international trade." 162 While stating that an amiable compositeur 
could disregard contractual rights for an abuse of such rights, the arbitral tribunal 
found that claimant's termination of a construction sub-contract was not 
arbitrary, and its calling under a risk exposure guarantee was not abusive. While 
the claimant stood to receive a large sum under the guarantee, the calling was 
just one of the remedies provided by the contract following a termination based 
on the default of the defendant. 
Both of these cases were decided under the ICC Arbitration Rules 1975 
and the arbitrators were accordingly constrained by the requirement of Article 
13(5) to "take into account" the provisions of the contract and the relevant trade 
usages. However, a number of ICC awards have recognised that amiable 
compositeurs can indeed depart from the terms of the contract. 163 This reflects a 
growing recognition by the French Courts that, without going so far as to alter 
the structure of the agreement, or impose fresh obligations not agreed by the 
parties, 164 an amiable compositeur may "mitigate rights created by the contract, 
to exclude the consequences of the strict application of the terms of the 
162 Mexican Construction Company v Belgian Company (Member of a Consortium) , Partial 
Award of 14 June 1979 in ICC Case No. 3267, (1982) Vll YBCA 96, at p. 104. 
163 See French Company v African State, ICC Case No. 3327 ( l 981 ), above fn 58; ICC Case No. 
3344 (l 981 ), ( I 982) J.D.I. 978 ; X & Y v Z & Mr W, ICC Case No. 4972 (1989), ( I 989) 116 J .D.l. 
1100, and observations by G. Aguilar Alvarez. Cited in Fouchard, Gaillard , Goldman, above fn 
21 at p. 841 , fn 304. 
164 See Parfums Stern France v CFFD, (19 April 1991 , Court of Appeal, Paris), (1991) REV 
ARB. 673 , and observations by E. Loquin. 
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contract." 165 Such an approach has been defended on the basis of the ability of 
an amiable compositeur to use his or her equitable powers to disregard the pacta 
sunt servanda principle, which holds that contracts are binding. 166 Ernest 
Metzger has suggested that this power is likely to be recognised in cases where, 
at the time the powers of amiable composition are conferred, the parties have 
signalled that their contract is subject to unforeseeable future events. In such a 
case, one can infer that the parties have placed their faith in the arbitrator to 
alleviate the harsh results of unexpected occurrences. 167 
In New Zealand and other countries that have adopted the UNCITRAL 
Model Law, the debate has largely been put to rest by Article 28( 4 ), which 
provides: 
"Jn all cases, the arbitral tribunal shall decide in accordance with the terms of the 
contract and shall take into account the usages of the trade applicable to the 
transaction." 
Stronger than its counterpart in the ICC rules, Sigvard Jarvin has described 
Article 28(4) as welcome clarification. 168 By requiring an arbitrator to decide "in 
accordance with the terms of the contract", Article 28(4) confirms that an 
amiable compositeur is bound by the regulatory framework of the parties ' 
agreement. As mentioned briefly above, this also brings into question the 
interpretation of amiable composition in A 's Company Ltd v Dagger, where 
Baragwanath J stated that "the Art 28(3) ' amiable compositeur' approach must 
result in modification of the strict language of the written contract to the extent of 
any inconsistency with a fair and equitable result. " 169 Any modification of, or 
departure from, clear contractual provisions would appear to breach an amiable 
165 See Unijet, above fn 89, and the decisions cited in Fouchard, Gaillard , Goldman, above fn 2 1 
at p. 84 I , fn 30 I . 
166 See Fouchard, Gaillard, Goldman, above fn 21 at p. 841-842. The authors also state that the 
change of circumstances doctrine could be utilised to come to the same outcome, citing Patrice 
Level , " L ' amiable composition dans le decret du 14 mai 1980 relatif a !' arbitrage" ( 1980) REV. 
ARB. 651 , at p. 656 et seq. 
167 See Ernest Metzger, case note, ( 1982) RE V A RB. 220, at p. 222, c ited in Craig, Park and 
Paulsson, above fn I O at p.1 I I, fn 12. 
168 Sigvard Jarvin, "The sources and limits of the arbitrator ' s powers" ( 1986) 2(2) Arb. lnt 'I 140, 
at p. 158. 
169 Above fn 83 , at para [ 146]. 
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compositeur' s mandate. 170 However, the cases on the construction of contractual 
documents illustrate that even apparently clear words "are susceptible to shades 
of meaning revealed by the surrounding circumstances." 171 In the event that any 
ambiguity can be established, it is likely that an amiable compositeur will be free 
to adopt the meaning that accords with the most equitable result. The ordinary 
rules of construction, as rules of law, could potentially be departed from, or 
ignored by an amiable compositeur. 
Nevertheless, the limit on the powers of an amiable compositeur imposed 
by Article 28( 4) may be argued to impede the efficacy of this type of arbitration. 
This is particularly so if, as Metzger suggests, parties confer the powers for 
contingency purposes. However, the parties may still enable an arbitrator to 
modify their agreement to reflect changes in circumstances by including what is 
commonly known as a hardship, revision, or adjustment clause. The 
effectiveness of such a clause has been widely debated and is beyond the scope 
of this work. 172 Conceivably though, the amiable compositeur will still be 
deciding "in accordance with the terms of the contract" if he or she applies the 
clause to effect any changes necessary to reach a fair solution. 
C. Duty to Seek the Fairest Solution 
170 A breach of that mandate could conceivably lead to setting aside proceedings based on Article 
34(2)(a)(iv) of the Model Law, which provides: 
"(2) An arbitral award may be set aside by [the relevant Court] only if: 
( ... ) 
(iv) the composition of the arbitral tribunal or the arbitral procedure was not in 
accordance with the agreement of the parties, unless such agreement was in confl ict with 
a provision of this Law from which the parties cannot derogate, or, failing such 
agreement, was not in accordance with this Law". (This author's emphasis). 
As Article 28( 4) is a provision of the Law from which the parties cannot derogate, failure to 
adhere to it will invoke Article 34(2)(a)(iv) regardless of any agreement to the contrary. 
171 Burrows, Finn, Todd, Law of Contract in New Zealand (2ed, LexisNexis Butterworths, 
Wellington, 2002) p. 173 . 
172 See Werner Melis, "Force Majeur and Hardship C lauses in International Commercial 
Contracts in View of the Practice of the ICC Court of Arbitration" ( 1984) I J. lnt'l Arb. 2 I 3; 
Alain Prujiner, " L'adaptation forcee du contrat par arbitrage" (1992) 37 McGill L J. 428; and 
Matthew de Boisseson, l e Droit Francais de l 'arbitrage lnterne et International (2 ed, 1990) 
185 . Cited in Fouchard, Gaillard, Goldman, above fn 21 at para 41, fn I 02. See also Berger, 
"Power of Arbitrators to Fill Gaps and Revise Contracts to Make Sense", in Fletcher, Mistelis 
and Cremona (eds), Foundations and Perspectives of International Trade law (Sweet & 
Maxwell , 200 I), at p. 269. Cited in Julian D M Lew QC, Loukas A Mistelis, Stefan M Kroll 
Comparative International Commercial Arbitration (Kluwer Law International , The Hague, The 
Netherlands, 2003), at p. 652, fn 142. 
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"From time to time ... lawyers and judges have tried to define what constitutes fairness. 
Like defining an elephant, it is not always easy to do, although fairness in practice has 
the elephantine quality of being easy to recognise. ,,n 
The quote of Lawton LJ above was made with regards to the principles of 
procedural fairness ( or natural justice), but the point appears equally apposite in 
regards to substantive fairness. As discussed above, a number of French cases 
have stressed that the duty of an amiable cornpositeur is to "seek the fairest 
solution". 174 But how will he or she be guided in this search? The apparent 
subjectivity involved in making such a decision is a principal criticism of 
amiable composition. 175 As Craig, Park and Paulsson have put it: 
"To refer to intuition or legal 'culture' is to invite the application of subjective values, a 
dangerous thing in view of the fact that the international framework must fit a world 
where ethical values are not always shared. ,,n 
While Ole Lando has argued that most arbitrators have a similar understanding of 
what is commercially fair, 177 the application of subjective values would seem to 
open the door to divergent results. Thus, like John Selden' s criticism of the Lord 
Chancellors in England, fairness may vary according to the length of the 
arbitrator's foot. This will obviously place an increased emphasis on the parties ' 
choice of arbitrator(s). Parties to a commercial disagreement will want to select 
an arbitrator(s) who understands the field in question, as well as the often harsh, 
but commercially fair realities of business. A diverse tribunal composition may 
also be used to ameliorate cultural differences in ethical values by ensuring that 
the prevailing considerations of fairness are shared by at least a majority of 
arbitrators. Ultimately though, such concerns relate to whether or not parties 
should opt for amiable composition, rather than to how an amiable compositeur 
should make his or her decision once appointed. The pros and cons of amiable 
173 Maxwell v Department of Trade and Industry and others [1974) 2 All ER 122, at 13 1 per 
Lawton LJ. 
174 See fn 75 and 76 above. 
175 For example, see Karen S. Weinberg, " Equity in International Arbitration: How Fair is ' Fa ir'? 
A Study of Lex Mercatoria and Amiable Composition" (1994) 12 B. U. lnt 'I L. J. 227, at p.246-
254 . 
176 Craig, Park and Paulsson, above fn I 0, at p. 111 . 
177 Ole Lando, "The Lex Mercatoria in International Commercial Arbitration" (I 985) 34 JCLQ 
747, at p.753 . 
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composition are discussed separately below. But as mentioned in relation to Lex 
Mercatoria, the fear of making an arbitrary or capricious decision drives many 
arbitrators to resort to national laws or general principles. While such rules may 
provide valuable guidance, an amiable compositeur should not fetter his or her 
discretion. Any attempt to establish objective rules for the exercise of that 
discretion will do exactly that. Like equity in the common law, amiable 
composition would then become rigid, and be rendered just another system of 
law. While it is true to say that "the law is rarely an instrument of oppression", 
178 arbitrators must also be cognisant that justice is not the exclusive domain of 
the law. Fairness is by nature an intuitive concept, and while the law may be 
designed to achieve fairness in given circumstances it is not omnicompetent. 
The concept does not exist in a vacuum, and what is fair in a given situation will 
depend upon all of the circumstances (including the law). Therefore, as Eric 
Loquin has stated: 
"A rbitration, in this perspective, responds differently than in a classic contentious 
procedure. It is characterised by a weakening of the j uridical character of litigation 
and by the predominance of its technical, psychological and commercial aspects. The 
amiable composition clause gives to the arbitrator the means of reducing the influence 
of law over the case in f avour of other f actors and allows him to extract f rom the facts 
what, in a healthy commercial environment, merits different treatment from the 
application of strict rules. ,,n 
But even Loquin has apparently attempted to draw out some objective 
approaches. The first requires the application of broad considerations such as a 
presumed intention of equality in the parties ' contractual rights and obligations, a 
presumed intention that the risk should be balanced between them, and the 
requirement of good faith . 180 Again, these considerations will provide valuable 
guidance. But it is antithetical to the nature of amiable composition that an 
arbitrator should be required to decide in accordance with such factors. In this 
178 F. A. Mann, Lex Facit Arbitrum, in Martinus Nijhoff, International Arbitration: Liber 
Amicorum f or Martin Domke (The Hague, 1967). Quoted in Wolfgang Peter, Arbitration and 
Renegotiation of International Investment Agreements (1986). 
179 Loquin, above fn 7, as tran slated in Lew (ed), Contemporary Problems in International 
Arbitration (Centre for Commercia l Law Studies, Queen Mary Co ll ege, Unive rsity of London, 
1986) pp.70-71 , fn 66. 
180 Set out in Craig, Park and Paulsson, above fn I 0, at p.111 . 
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author's view, amiable composition appeals to the notions of justice vested in the 
individual arbitrator and he or she should not shirk that responsibility. 
In retrospect, a party may well prefer an objective decision at law. Like 
an agreement that an arbitral award shall be final and binding without recourse to 
appeal, the choice of amiable composition may appear foolish in hindsight. But 
in different circumstances, the discretion may have been utilised in that party' s 
favour. That is the prospect that the party has contracted for. Any complaint 
after the event can therefore be viewed sceptically. Given the parties ' express 
choice, an amiable compositeur should not feel compelled to mask his or her 
decision with purportedly objective criteria. The duty of the amiable 
compositeur is not to make each party happy. Or is it? 
D. Duty to Seek the Most Conciliatory Solution? 
As discussed above, 181 Eric Loquin has argued that the mission of an amiable 
compositeur is to work towards the most conciliatory solution. This approach is 
consistent with the origins of amiable composition and the Canonist aim of re-
establishing harmony between the parties by working out a new legal 
relationship going forward. Where the parties are in a long-term or continuing 
relationship, this approach has clear merit. The value of the relationship will 
generally exceed the interests at stake in any particular dispute. However, there 
is a risk with such an approach that the arbitrator will, like Solomon, simply 
"split the baby" in an attempt to keep everyone happy. The method would also 
appear to have little application to short-term relationships (although the same 
might be said of amiable composition itself). Perhaps then, the value of any 
continuing relationship could instead be treated as a primary consideration in 
establishing what the fairest result is. After all, the fairest result should be the 
most conciliatory. 
The existence of an amiable composition clause may even induce the 
parties to reconcile of their own volition. If the parties are aware that any dispute 
will be referred to an amiable compositeur, who will have the power to decide 
the fairest or most conciliatory solution, the parties would be sensible to save 
181 See Part II D 4 " Re-establishing harmony in commercia l dealings" 
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time and expense by negotiating that outcome themselves. Because neither party 
can rely on his or her legal position, constructive discussions are facilitated. 
Thus, Loquin has noted that the clause has a "preventive function" and is a "sign 
of good faith which should permeate their future relations." 182 
IV. THE LEGAL EFFICACY OF AMIABLE COMPOSITION CLAUSES 
A. Common Law Doubts Extinguished 
Insofar as s.46(1 )(b) of the Arbitration Act 1996 (UK) will enable amiable 
composition, this represents a back to the future shift for arbitration in England. 
An arbitrator ' s duty was not always to decide according to law, but like the 
amiable compositeur he or she was expected to settle a dispute equitably. 183 In 
1791 , the Lord Chancellor opined that " ... the arbitrator has a greater latitude 
than the court in order to do complete justice between the parties", instancing the 
ability to "relieve against a right which bears hard upon one party ... " 184 Later, 
In re Badger held that an arbitrator could ignore the common law rule regarding 
the circumstances in which a debtor must pay interest. 185 In 1888 the Privy 
Council upheld a Canadian clause of amiable composition in Rolland v 
Cassidy. 186 Their Lordships were not prepared to sanction a complete disregard 
for the law, but stated that the clause could "dispense with the strict observance 
of those rules of law the non-observance of which, as applied to awards, results 
in no more than irregularity." 187 This more limited stance coincided with an 
increasing emphasis on substantive rules of law, which had previously been 
rendered uncertain by the civil law juries ' "equitable appreciation" of the law. 188 
As the rules became more certain, arbitrators were expected to apply them for the 
sake of uniformity. 
182 Above fn 121. 
183 Lord Parker of Waddington, "The History and Development of Common Law Arbitration" 
(The Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Lionel Cohen Lectures, 1959). Cited in David, above fn 
12, at p.111 , fn 57. 
184 Knox v Sy mmonds ( 1791) I Yes . Jun . 369, at p. 370 . 
185 ( 1819) 2 B & A. 691 . 
186 
( 1888) 13 App Cas 770 . 
187 Above fn 186, at p. 773 . 
188 David, above fn 12, at p. I 11 . 
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For reasons of cost and time the mercantile community of the period 
preferred to avoid litigation in the Courts. In the words of one Judge: 
"They prefer even the hazardous and mysterious chances of arbitration, in which some 
arbitrator, who knows about as much of law as he does of theology, by the application of 
a rough and ready moral consciousness, or upon the affable principle of dividing the 
victory equally between both sides, decides intricate questions of law and fact with equal 
ease. " 189 
Recourse to the Courts was only available where an error of law was apparent on 
the face of the award, or where a special case had been stated or ordered. 190 
Understandably, parties grew dissatisfied with this situation and this prompted 
the establishment of commercial causes in the High Court. 191 An attempt by the 
Refined Sugar Association to preclude arbitrators acting under its rules from 
stating a special case to the Court prompted the Court of Appeal decision of 
Czarnikow v Roth, Schmidt and Company. 192 
Czarnikow famously held that the purported ouster of the Courts' 
statutory jurisdiction was contrary to public policy and ineffective. The decision 
was justified on the basis of the Courts' need to supervise arbitration and, in the 
words of Bankes LJ, " ... to secure that the law that is administered by an 
arbitrator is the law of the land and not some home-made law of the particular 
19' arbitrator. .. " ., Lord Justice Scrutton also emphasised " ... the importance of 
administering settled principles of law in commercial disputes ... " 194 In a 
subsequent case, Denning LJ stated " ... there is not one law for arbitrators and 
another for the court. There is one law for all." 195 Relying heavily on the 
platform set by Czarnikow, Megaw J stated in Orion that an arbitrator was 
required to "apply a fixed and recognisable system of law". 196 If the parties 
could agree that the dispute be decided other than in accordance with the law, the 
Courts' jurisdiction would effectively be ousted, since there would be no 
189 Judge unknown, The Times, 10 August 1892. Cited in Anthony D. Colman, The Practice and 
Procedure of the Commercial Court (Lloyd s of London Press Ltd, London, 1983) at p. 5 
19° Common Law Procedure Act 1854, sections 4 or 5; and later the Arbitration Act 1889, s. 7. 
191 See Colman, above fn 189, at p.5. 
192 
[ I 922] 2 K.B. 478. Hereafter C:::arnikow. 
193 Above, fn 192 at p. 484. 
194 Above, fn 192 at p. 489. 
195 David Taylor & Son Ltd v Barnell Trading Co [ 1953] I W.L.R. 562, at p. 570. 
196 Orion, above fn 30. 
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question of law for the Court to review. As mentioned above, His Honour's 
sentiments have been echoed in much later cases, even after the Arbitration Act 
1979 (UK) removed the case stated jurisdiction and gave recognition to 
agreements excluding any right to appeal on a question of law. 197 In this author's 
view, these amendments undermined the reasoning in Czarnikow by removing 
the primary means of supervision and placing a greater emphasis on party 
autonomy. In fact, arbitral practice may already have circumvented the strictures 
of these rulings and enabled equitable considerations to be applied even in the 
absence of a choice by the parties. Arbitrators frequently refused to give official 
reasons for their awards, instead delivering unsigned explanations, which could 
not be cited in a Court. 198 As Lord Tangley stated: 
"No experienced arbitrator will perpetrate an error of law on the face of the award, and 
no sensible arbitrator, unless he is called upon to state a special case, will give his 
reasons. Observing this facade, I strongly suspect that English arbitration is as 
successful as it is because arbitrators do act ex aequo et bono and behave as good and 
reliable amiable compositeurs." 199 
Both the English and New Zealand Arbitration Acts of 1996 now require reasons 
to be given in the absence of an agreement to the contrary, or an agreed award. 200 
Nevertheless, the practice appeared to contradict the law. 
Even leaving aside such covert methods, there are a number of examples 
of extra-legal decision-making that belie any unqualified aspiration for the 
uniform application of the law. For example, in New Zealand the equity and 
good conscience jurisdiction of the District Court,201 and the Magistrate's Court 
before that, has enabled decision-makers to do justice in individual cases, 
197 See above, fn 38. 
198 See Craig, Park and Paulsson, above fn 10, at p.349, note 7. 
199 Lord Tangley, "International Arbitration Today" ( 1966) 15 International and Comparative 
Law Quarterly 719, at p. 722. 
200 Arbitration Act 1996 (UK), s. 52( 4 ); Arbitration Act 1996 (NZ), First Schedule, Clause 3 l (2) . 
The Arbitration Act 1979 (UK) allowed the High Court to order reasons to be given in certain 
circumstances to assist with the possible prosecution of an appeal (s. I (5)). Without the consent 
of all the parties to the reference (s.5(1 )(a)), this could only occur with the leave of the Court and 
where the parties had either notified the arbitrator of the requirement for an award or had good 
reason for not giving such notification (s. I (6)). Where an exclusion agreement was in place, 
reasons could only be ordered with the consent of all the parties to the reference (ss I (5) and 
3( 1 )(b )). 
20 1 District Courts Act 1947, s. 59. 
regardless of strict rules of law.202 Local Courts of Requests formerly served the 
same role in England.203 But while the New Zealand Supreme Court in Karori 
Borough v Buxton20./ held that a Magistrate's Court was bound to apply a Statute, 
no such limitation is placed on the Disputes Tribunals of this country. Section 
18(6) of the Disputes Tribunals Act 1988 requires a referee to decide "according 
to the substantial merits and justice of the case". While bound to have regard to 
the law, a referee is not required to "give effect to strict legal rights or obligations 
or to legal forms or technicalities." Appeals are limited to matters of procedural 
faimess. 205 Both the equity and good conscience jurisdiction of the District 
Court and that of the Disputes Tribunal are limited to relatively small amounts of 
money.206 Each jurisdiction represents a policy decision by Parliament that small 
disputes are best dealt with in an informal and final manner. Judge Willy has 
suggested that amiable composition could serve a similar purpose in arbitration, 
citing a common experience that the resolution of such disputes according to 
strict legal rights could be costly and time consuming, as well as "the danger of 
oppression by the financially stronger party of the weaker. .. "207 Furthermore, 
parties can be bound in each jurisdiction by decisions that are contrary to the law, 
regardless of any choice on their part. Surely then, two commercial parties 
should be free to choose to resolve their disputes in such a manner by reference 
to amiable composition. Those parties will be in the best position to assess 
whether the interests at stake should be protected by reference to strict legal 
rights, or according to broader considerations. 
In Orion, Megaw J also suggested that an agreement for amiable 
composition would also render a contract void due to a lack of intention to create 
legal relations.208 
But at the very least the parties have agreed to arbitration by way of amiable 
composition.209 Provided that agreement is enforceable, the parties have 
202 See Pearson v Clark, above fn 72; and Karori Borough v Buxton, above fn 73. 
203 See Scott v Bye (2 Bing. 344), cited in Pearson v Clark, above fn 72. 
204 Above fn 73. 
205 See s.50( I) of the Disputes Tribunals Act 1988 and NZ! insurance New Zealand Ltd v 
Auckland District Court [ 1993] 3 NZLR 453. 
206 $3000.00 in the District Court (s. 59 District Courts Act 194 7), and $7,500.00 in the Disputes 
Tribunals (s. l 0( I A)(b) of the Disputes Tribunals Act 1988), or $12,000.00 by consent (s. 13(2) of 
the Disputes Tribunals Act 1988). 
207 Willy, A.A.P. Arbitration in New Zealand (2ed, LexisNexis, Wellington, 2003), at p. 113-114. 
208 Orion, above fn 30 at p. 264. 
therefore entered into legal relations. The problem, of course, is that the scope of 
their respective rights and obligations is subject to an equitable override. This 
leads to the argument that the contract is void for uncertainty. As Mustill and 
Boyd have surmised: 
"Here we are faced with a circular problem. ff the court decides that as a matter of 
commercial policy it should uphold the validity of the substantive contract and of the 
arbitration agreement, notwithstanding the presence of an equity clause, it will have to 
interpret the clause in a way which enables this result to conform with the law of 
contract and of arbitration. If, on the other hand, the Court decides that commercial 
policy requires the clause to be given the meaning which the parties themselves 
intended, it may be constrained to hold that the effectiveness of the substantive contract 
or the arbitration agreement, or both, must yield to this paramount intention. "210 
To date, the English Courts have signalled their preference for the former option, 
and clauses have been read down to comply with the law - the very thing that 
clauses of amiable composition seek to reduce the influence of. Yet, as Mustill 
and Boyd note, the same Catch-22 is not dealt with in the foreign literature. 
Why? 
"Many codes of procedure expressly recognise the power of the arbitrator ... to act as 
amiable compositeur if the contract so provides. The validity of an equity clause, and its 
compatibility with a binding contract, are therefore not in doubt, so that the Court and 
the jurists are under no pressure to force an artificial meaning on the clause in order to 
save the contract. "211 
With the reception of Article 28(3) of the Model Law in New Zealand and the 
enactment of s.46(1 )(b) of the Arbitration Act 1996 (UK) in England, the san1e 
can now be said for these countries. However, a very similar provision has been 
treated quite differently in Australia. 
209 In Deutsche Schachtbau, above fn 48, at p. 779, Donaldson MR referred to the "vital 
distinction" between an agreement to agree in future and an agreement to accept terms 
determined by a third party, stating that the latter was enforceable, but the former was not. Cf 
Mustill and Boyd, above fn 8, at pp.83-84, who state that the role of a third party is to fill gaps in 
an executory contract, not one where the time for performance has already passed. 
2 10 Mustill and Boyd, above fn 8, at p. 76. 
2 11 Mustill and Boyd, above fn 8, at p. 76, note 12. 
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In Woodbud Pty Ltd v Warea Pty Ltd2 12, Young J considered the meaning 
of s.22(2) of the Commercial Arbitration Act 1984 (NSW), which provided that 
where the parties so agree, an arbitrator "may determine any question that arises 
for determination in the course of proceedings under the agreement by reference 
to considerations of general justice and fairness." This provision is therefore 
closely aligned with the New Zealand amendment to Article 28(3), which boldly 
attempts to define amiable composition as the power to decide "according to 
considerations of general justice and fairness". 213 After referring to some of the 
English authorities, Young J stated that it was debatable whether the provision 
went any further than Rowland v Cassidy (supra). With respect, this ruling fails 
to recognise is that the cases relied upon were made at a time when English law 
did not contain a provision such as s.22(2). There was therefore no recognition 
of the validity of such a power, or of its compatibility with a binding contract. 
The supervisory jurisdiction of the Courts required arbitrators to decide 
according to law. On that basis, the English Courts strained and severely limited 
the meaning of equity clauses. Such forced meanings are no longer defensible in 
light of the prominence now given to party autonomy and the limitation of 
judicial intervention.214 
B. Civil Law Differences 
While the English Courts have laboured with the concept of amiable 
composition, the civil law has had no such difficulty. Given that the common 
law is a system based largely on Judge-made law, as opposed to the codes of the 
Romano-Germanic tradition, one might have expected the reverse to be true. 
However, a code-based system is not reliant on cases to establish the law. Given 
that precedent is the foundation on which the development of the law depends, it 
is perhaps understandable that the common law has been reluctant to allow 
discretionary decisions based only on the circumstances of the case at hand. 
212 Unreported, Supreme Court of New South Wales, Equity Division, BC95048 I 8, 15 June 1995, 
Young J. Cited in Hewitt v McKensey [2003] NSWSC 1186. 
2 13 Article 28(3) of the First Schedule to the Arbitration Act I 996 provides : 
"The arbitral tribunal shall decide ex aequo et bono or as amiable compositeur (according lo 
considerations of general justice and fairness) only if the parties have expressly authorised it to 
do so." (This author' s emphasis). 
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Such recognition would decrease the pool of cases through which the law could 
grow_21s 
Given the wide manner in which the civil-law codes are drafted, Judges 
are often required to apply general principles to fill gaps.216 This approach is 
alien to common law Judges, 217 and places more discretion in the hands of their 
civil-law counterparts. From this platform, it may be easier for civil-law jurists 
to recognise the type of discretion granted to an amiable compositeur. Some of 
the codes recognise fundamental principles, which like amiable composition can 
be used to mitigate the harsh effects of the law.218 In fact, some civil law 
jurisdictions recogruse "super-eminent" principles outside the codes.21 9 
According to David: 
" ... the law, which is no more than the endless quest for better justice, lies not wholly nor 
exclusively in the manner in which it may have been interpreted at a particular time, 
under the influence of various factors, by public authorities in different countries. We 
do not abandon the domain of law when we recogni:::e, in some cases, that a law 
superior to state laws may exist, superior inasmuch as it affords a greater place to 
. ,,220 equity. 
As McDowell and Webb note, such a view has probably been reinforced by the 
Nazi domination of civil-law countries during World War II.22 1 However, while 
amiable composition may be linked to the recognition of super-eminent 
principles, the concept preceded any Nazi influences. 
214 For a useful discussion of these objects, see Lord Cooke ofThorndon, "Party autonomy" 
(1999)30(1) VUWLR257. 
215 See Weinberg, above fn 175, at p.250. 
216 For example, see Art. 12(2) of the Italian Civil Code, which provides that "if a controversy 
cannot be decided by a precise provision, consideration is given to provisions that regulate 
similar cases or analogous matters ; if the case still remains in doubt, it is decided according to the 
general principles of the legal order of the State." Cited in Caslav Pejovic, "Civi l Law and 
Common Law: Two Different Paths Leading to the Same Goal" (200 I) 32(3) VU WLR 8 I 7, note 
6. 
217 See John O Hannold , Uniform Law for International Sales (3ed, Kluwer, The Hague, 1999) at 
pp.104-105. 
218 Art. 7 of the Austrian Civil Code enables a Judge to refer to natural law; Art. 281 of the Greek 
Civil Code prohibits the exercise of a right that breaches good faith, good morals, or is not in 
accordance with the social and economic purpose of the right. See Morag McDowell and Duncan 
Webb, The New Zealand legal system: structures, processes and legal theory (3ed, Lexis-Nexis, 
Wellington, 2002) at p. 41. 
2 19 See McDowell and Webb, above fn 218. 
220 David, above fn 12, at p.335 . 
221 See McDowell and Webb, above fn 218. 
Finally, it is arguable that the greater use of amiable composition on the 
Continent correlates with a wider recognition of good faith obligations in the 
civil law. As discussed above, Loquin has convincingly linked the two 
concepts. 222 This may also explain why the majority of English amiable 
composition cases relate to re-insurance treaties, which are based on utmost good 
faith. 
C. The United States 
In America, amiable composition 1s not expressly recognised.223 But 
arbitrators apparently assume the powers of an amiable compositeur as a matter 
of course. Some commentators have opined that this approach is attributable to 
the "wide awareness in Anglo-American development of 'equity' as an integral 
element of ' law'. "224 An arbitrator is expected to "do justice as he sees it, 
applying his own sense of law and equity to the facts as he finds them."225 The 
Federal Arbitration Act 1925 contains very limited grounds for vacatur, and a 
misinterpretation of the law is not one of them. 226 On the other hand, in Wilko v 
Swan227 the Supreme Court indicated that "manifest disregard" of the law could 
also lead to vacatur under the Act. This might occur where the arbitrator 
correctly cited the law, but proceeded to ignore it.228 However, a number of 
decisions have established that the doctrine is not available in international 
cases.229 
V. PERCEIVED ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES/RISKS 
222 See Part III D "Duty to Seek the Most Conciliatory Solution?" 
223 Stein, Steven J. and Wotman, Daniel R. " International Commercial Arbitration in the 1980 's: 
A Comparison of the Major Arbitral Systems and Rules" ( 1983) 38 Bus. law. 1685, at p.1714. 
224 See Craig, Park and Paulsson, above fn I 0, at p. 110. 
225 Jn the Matter of the Arbitration between Silverman and Benmor Coats Inc 61 N.Y.2d 299, 
308; 473 N .Y.S.2d 774, 779; 461 N.E.2d 1261, 1266 (1984). 
226 San Martine Compania de Navegacion, SA. v Saguenay Terminals Ltd293 F.2d 796 (1961). 
227 
( I 953) 346 US 436-437. 
228 See Bell Aerospace Company Division of Textron Inc v local ( 1973) 516 F Supp 354, 356 
(WD NY); Siegel v Titan industrial Corp (1985) 779 F 2d 893 (2d Cir). 
229 See Brandeis fntsel Ltd v Calabrian Chemicals Corp. 656 F. Supp. 160, 163-68 (J.D.N.Y. 
1987); Merrill lynch v Bobker 808 F.2d. 930, 933-34 (2d Cir, 1986); Parsons v Whittemore, 
above fn 142; and International Standard Electric Corporation (US) v Bridas Sociedad Anonima 
Petro/era, Industrial y Comercial, above fn 139. 
A. Perceived Advantages 
I. Flexibility and efficiency 
The obvious advantage of amiable composition 1s the ability of the 
arbitrator to tailor a result to suit the circumstances. This flexibility may prove 
invaluable to a long-term relationship by enabling a resolution that lets both 
parties move forward amicably. According to Karen Weinberg, if the parties 
seek flexibility then they should opt for mediation. That way they can "ensure a 
focus on their own sense of justice rather than that of the arbitrator. "230 But if the 
parties could agree on a resolution, then the matter would not have been referred 
to arbitration in the first place. The parties require a binding and enforceable 
award. 
In other cases, amiable composition may enable the arbitrator to cut 
through the legalities and deliver a quick decision. As mentioned above,231 this 
could prove very useful in determining disputes involving small amounts of 
money, or where a fast outcome is required. 
In practice, arbitrators utilise these powers very circumspectly. They are 
most frequently used in assessing the consequences of non-performance, where 
they can free an arbitrator from the rules regarding the calculation of damages or 
interest.232 For example, in ICC Case No. 9726 the defendant Dutch buyer was 
held to have breached an agreement for the sale and purchase of calf skins, 
having failed to collect and pay for the skins. Deciding as amiable compositeur 
the arbitral tribunal calculated the damage suffered by the French seller on the 
basis of the price difference between the initial contract price and the mean sale 
price of calf skins in October 2001. 233 
2. A-nationality 
?'O _, Weinberg, above fn 175 at p.252. 
23 1 See Part IV A "Common Law Doubts Extinguished" 
232 See Craig, Park and Paulsson, above fn I 0, at p. 353. 
233 French seller v Dutch buyer, ICC Case No. 9726, (2003) XXVIIJ YBCA 13, at p.18. ee also 
Purchaser from a West-African Country v U.S. Supplier, Awards of June 1984 and May 1985 in 
ICC Case No. 4567, ( I 986) Xl YBCA 143, at p. 146 (determination of amount of incidental 
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Perhaps the greatest perceived advantage of arbitration m the 
international arena is neutrality. Rightly or wrongly, most parties are reluctant to 
submit to the domestic law of their opponent. This often leads to the choice of 
an apparently neutral law, which can lead to problems in itself should it be 
inadequately researched. Furthermore, domestic laws are often ill equipped to 
deal with international matters. A reference to amiable composition may provide 
the a-nationality sought. 
3. New and technical areas of law 
The law is frequently inadequate to deal with new and emerging issues, 
particularly regarding technological developments. An amiable compositeur 
may use his or her powers to remedy any deficiency. 
4. Increased recognition of commercial and technical aspects 
As discussed above, 234 amiable composition enables an increased 
recognition of the technical, psychological and commercial aspects of the case. 
5. Finality 
Probably the ultimate expression of party autonomy is the agreement of 
the parties to submit their dispute to arbitration, to the exclusion of the Courts, 
and to accept the result, for better or for worse. The consequence of the respect 
now accorded to agreements of this kind is that the parties are stuck with them -
pacta sunt servanda. In Pupeke Service Station Ltd v Caltex Oil (NZ) LtcF35, 
Lord Mustill put it this way: 
"Jn prospect, this method often seems attractive. In retrospect, this is not always so 
Having agreed at the outset to take his disputes away from the Court the losing party 
may afterwards be tempted to think better of it, and ask the Court to interfere because 
damages claimed on account of technical assistance rendered by a French company in negotiating 
the purchase of a substitute High power Microwave Amplifier) . 
234 See Part lll C "Duty to Seek the Fairest Solution" above. 
49 
the arbitrator has misunderstood the issues, believed an unconvincing witness, decided 
against the weight of the evidence, or otherwise arrived at a wrong conclusion. All 
developed systems of arbitration law have in principle set their face against 
accommodating such a change of mind. The parties have made a choice, and must 
abide by it. " 
This represents a major shift from the time when the Courts regarded an ouster of 
their power to require an arbitrator to state a special case as contrary to public 
policy, and void.236 Judicial workloads are now such that arbitrators are no 
longer jealously perceived as rivals237, and alternative dispute resolution (' ADR') 
mechanisms are now actively promoted to ease the burden. 
The importance of finality, and the consequent limitation of judicial 
intervention, is that it fosters certainty in commercial decision-making. By 
opting for an arbitration clause in their agreement, the parties can avoid the 
delay, expense and uncertainty associated with the appeal process. Properly 
understood, amiable composition is incompatible with a right of appeal and 
therefore fosters finality. 
B. Perceived Disadvantages and Risks 
I. Ambiguities 
In this author's view, one of the biggest risks of amiable composition 
stems from the uncertain meaning of the term. In A 's Company Ltd v Dagger, 
the parties clearly failed to comprehend what their election contemplated. 
2. Subjectivity and bias 
235 Unreported, Privy Council , Appeal No. 63/ 1994, 16 November 1995. See [2000) 3 NZLR 
318, atp338. 
236 Jn C:::arnikow v Roth, Schmidt & Co [ 1922) 2 KB 478, Scrutton L J famously stated at p.488 
that " [t]here must be no Alsatia [a haunt of thieves] in England where the King's writ does not 
run" . C:::arnikow was restrictively distinguished by the New Zealand Court of Appeal in CB! NZ 
Ltd v Badger Chiyoda [ l 989) 2 NZLR 669, on the basis that C:::arnikow was concerned with 
unequal bargaining power, so that one of the parties was virtually forced to accept the ouster 
clause. The Arbitration Act 1996 (see below) has now clarified the limits of judicial review. 
237 Lord Cooke of Thorndon " Party Autonomy" ( 1999) 30( l) VU WLR 257, 259. 
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The title of this paper was chosen to reflect the subjectivity inherent in 
the task of the amiable compositeur. As stated above, that subjectivity will place 
an emphasis on the selection of a wise and reliable arbitral tribunal. As for bias, 
like any arbitrator an amiable compositeur is required to treat the parties with 
equality, and failure to do so will place any award in danger of attack. 
3. Lack of predictability of outcome 
The outcome of a particular case may be more difficult to establish in 
advance, but an election for amiable composition signals that winning is less 
important than getting an outcome. Amiable composition is geared towards 
providing for the future. Nevertheless, an amiable compositeur will still be 
required to hear the parties ' respective cases, so not all predictability will be lost. 
4. Lack of uniformity in the development of the law 
This argument is based on a misconception regarding the role of amiable 
composition. Because a decision is based upon subjective values, it will serve no 
precedent value (other than perhaps as to the extent of the constituent powers) 
and does not have an expository role. 
5. Loss of confidence in arbitration 
Provided amiable composition remains an expression of party autonomy, 
then it will not logically result in any loss of confidence in arbitration. If parties 
choose to provide an arbitrator with a subjective discretion, which is 
subsequently exercised to their dissatisfaction, the problem lies with the choice, 
not the system. 
IV. CONCLUSIONS 
While amiable composition may lead to uncertainty in some situations, so 
too may reference to a foreign law (which for the purposes of neutrality may be 
foreign to both parties). The flexibility offered enhances efficiency and this may 
be more important to commercial parties. Certainty of resolution may have 
higher value than certainty of result for many such parties - particularly those in 
long term and evolving relationships that would prefer a focus on the future, 
rather than the past. While it may be right to say that amiable composition 
cannot provide the uniformity necessary to the integrity and viability of the 
international business community, who ever claimed it could? Amiable 
composition ultimately forms a very small part of arbitration and can generally 
only be conducted at the express direction of the parties. And because it 
represents the exercise of an arbitral discretion, it really has no precedent value at 
all, since cases tum on their own facts and the individual arbitrator's conceptions 
of justice. In that respect, amiable composition is often confused with !ex 
mercatoria, which unlike the former, requires the application of trans-national 
rules and may have a more expository function. 
Amiable composition is a discrete and exceptional mode of arbitration to 
be used only in special circumstances and with a full consensus among the 
parties as to what it will entail. Ultimately, however, there is nothing wrong with 
two parties deciding to grant their chosen arbitrator the discretion to decide 
between their competing claims based upon his or her individual conceptions of 
fairness. Those who fear it need not choose it. To the extent that it is chosen, 
amiable composition represents a back to the future type change for English law. 
After more than a century of jealous Court supervision, parties can once again 
choose to have their dispute finally decided by a commercial man or woman 
based on what he or she considers to be fair in the trade in question. Party 
autonomy dictates that such choices must now be put into effect. 
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